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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of converting steam-
powered propulsion plants on-board Wasp-Class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) hulls 1 
through 7 to hybrid propulsion. The objective of this research was to evaluate the net 
present value of conversion by weighing the cost-savings benefits of fuel savings, in-port 
utility consumption, and manpower against the cost of conversion. The results of the 
analysis conclude that LHDs 5 and 7 have a positive net present value; therefore, their 
conversion is recommended. LHD 6 can have a positive net present value with 
recommended complex overhaul schedule changes. Recommendations are made to 
maximize benefits to the Navy, considering potential changes in force structure and follow-
on studies. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
PURPOSE 
Steam-powered Wasp-class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) utilize an aging steam 
propulsion system that yields poor underway fuel economy, increased pier-side utility 
consumption, and increased manning compared to their gas turbine counterparts. 
Furthermore, reliance on steam-powered LHD-class ships is expected well past 2030 due 
to lifetime extensions for older ships and production gaps in the America-class program. 
These steam ships require costly, dedicated maintenance and infrastructure, which is 
distinct from all other non-nuclear Navy vessels. Until now, relatively little has been done 
to identify the costs and benefits of converting LHD 1–7 to a more advanced, fuel-efficient 
propulsion platform (Gingras, Scarborough, Howard, & McCleery, 1998). The purpose of 
this thesis is to provide the Navy with a conservative estimate of the net present value 
(NPV) of this conversion. 
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPORTANCE  
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. 
No. 115-91, stated that “it shall be the policy of the United States to have available, as soon 
as practicable, not fewer than 355 battle force ships, comprised of the optimal mix of 
platforms” (p. 267). However, the 355-ship requirement is being reviewed by the ongoing 
2019 force structure assessment (FSA). The former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
John M. Richardson, discussed the FSA by stating “While data-driven analysis may 
ultimately change the details of our long-term fleet architecture, all force structure analyses 
agree in one respect: we must build a bigger Navy” (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations [OPNAV], 2019b, p. 6). The pending results of the newest force structure 
assessment (FSA) introduces uncertainty to the current balance of forces and future 
procurements plans. This thesis provides the flexibility for the Navy to plan for a larger, 
more capable fleet while accounting for the unknown future requirements. 
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BACKGROUND 
Converting steam-powered LHD hulls to hybrid propulsion is not a new discussion 
topic for the U.S. Navy. Previous studies have identified fuel and manpower cost-savings, 
as well as determining that conversion is feasible (Gingras et al., 1998; Hatcher, S., 
Oswald, A., Boughner, A., 2002; Naval Sea Systems Command 05L/PMS 377, 2001). 
Furthermore, the hybrid-powered USS Makin Island (LHD 8) has proven these engineering 
concepts, namely the reduced fuel costs, through operational experience (USS Makin 
Island (LHD 8), 2012). Current studies propose a complex overhaul (COH) and conversion 
plan for LHD 1–8 that will extend LHD lifetimes from 40 years to 50 years (OPNAV N953, 
2018; OPNAV N95, 2019). The steam-to-hybrid conversion will result in an engineering 
plant similar to LHD 8 being installed on LHD 1–7. Converted ships will also have the 
benefit of increased interoperability and lethality by modernizing command and control 
systems when coupled with the COH (OPNAV N953, 2018). 
METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses the standard for performing cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on 
government programs, Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost 
Analysis of Federal Programs, produced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB, 
1992). The goal for the CBA is to determine if the benefits offered from conversion 
outweigh the cost incurred, resulting in a positive NPV. The four primary benefits (cost-
savings) are identified as underway fuel economy, not underway (auxiliary steaming) fuel 
economy, pier-side utility consumption, and manning, while the principle cost is incurred 
from the conversion process. Historical cost data for fuel and manpower is retrieved from 
Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC), while 
utility cost data is retrieved from Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC).  
Manpower cost-savings are calculated by taking the historical class average for 
LHD 1–7 and comparing it to the average of LHD 8 for all available years of operation. 
Utility cost-savings are determined by developing annual in-port usage rates at Naval 
Station Norfolk as well as Naval Base San Diego and comparing the total average cost of 
LHD 1–7 to the in-port cost of LHD 8. The primary consideration for utility consumption 
is based on the removal of all steam from LHD 1–7 by converting to all-electric auxiliaries. 
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This results in converted ships incurring higher electric costs than non-converted LHDs, 
however, it eliminates steam consumption and subsequent steam costs. Fuel cost-savings 
are determined by comparing the LHD 1–7 class average barrel (BBL) usage for underway, 
as well as not underway (auxiliary steaming) to LHD 8 average BBL usage.  
Fuel price volatility is accounted for by using NAVSEA’s (2012) Design Data 
Sheet (DDS) 200–2, Calculation of Surface Ship Annual Energy Usage, Annual Energy 
Cost, and Fully Burdened Cost of Energy. DDS 200–2 uses the Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) annual outlook to model fuel price changes until the year 2050. 
The model outputs three different scenarios for fuel price, a reference case (baseline), a 
high oil price, and a low oil price. In addition to fuel price volatility, this thesis also 
accounts for the fully burdened cost of fuel (FBCF). Historical studies, such as the re-
engining of the Boeing B-52H that have not considered the FBCF, failed to fully account 
for the cost-savings gained from improved fuel efficiencies (Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense For Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2004). This thesis uses both the 
DDS 200–2, as well as a 2009 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis that studied the 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyer FBCF to develop a rough order of magnitude LHD FBCF 
(Corley, 2009).  
KEY FINDINGS 
The results for the CBA, performed using a 30-year nominal discount rate of 3.6% 
derived from OMB Circular A-94 and the reference fuel price, conclude that LHD 5 and 7 
have a positive NPV for conversion when homeported in San Diego. LHD 6 would have a 
positive NPV if its conversion and overhaul can be accelerated and its homeport remains 
in San Diego. Norfolk does not yield any positive NPVs for conversion. This is mainly due 
to shore steam pricing, which is nearly ten times higher in San Diego as compared to 
Norfolk. The low cost of steam in Norfolk results in the conversion having a negative PV 
for utility consumption, thus becoming a cost rather than a benefit. Therefore, all converted 
LHD ships are recommended to be in San Diego. A combination of the COH timeline and 
remaining service life results in LHD 1–4 having a negative NPV for conversion. 
Additionally, the concurrent OPNAV N95 (2019) conversion study has determined that 
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LHD 1–4 are not convertible until further studies are conducted to address vessel center of 
gravity concerns. 
CONCLUSIONS  
Conclusion #1: Convert LHD 5 and 7 to hybrid propulsion. The primary 
conclusion is that LHD 5 and 7 should be converted from steam to hybrid propulsion and 
homeported in San Diego following the complex overhaul plan proposed by OPNAV N953 
(2018). Due to the difference in shore steam costs, converted ships should be homeported 
in San Diego, and steamships should be homeported in Norfolk. This course of action 
requires shifting homeports in order to preserve the number of large-deck amphibious ships 
on each coast. 
Conclusion #2: Optimize the COH schedule for LHD 6 conversion. The current 
COH timeline does not schedule LHD 6 for conversion until FY 2037, resulting in a 
negative NPV for Norfolk and San Diego. As a result, this thesis has analyzed potential 
conversion starting dates, which would result in a positive NPV for LHD 6 conversion. 
These dates are FY 2023 and FY 2025, with an NPV of $33.8 million FY 2019 and $1.1 
million FY 2019, respectively. Norfolk retained a negative NPV during this analysis, 
therefore, LHD 6 must remain in San Diego if converted.  
Conclusion #3: Future demand considerations are uncertain. Different factors of 
Navy policy, such as the emerging great power competition, fiscal situation, employment 
method, and capabilities shortfall, indicate possible changes in Navy policy for LHDs. 
These policy changes will be developed in the results of the 2019 force structure 
assessment (FSA), which will determine the future demand for big deck amphibious ships. 
This will result in one of three alternatives when considering the large deck amphibious 
force.  
First, if the Navy increases the number of large-deck amphibious ships required, 
there will be benefits in extending and converting steam-powered LHDs. This is because 
the Navy may need to operate LHDs past the current 40-year service life to meet force size 
requirements. When coupled with the COH, converted ships will have the added benefit of 
increased interoperability and lethality by modernizing command and control systems 
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(OPNAV N953, 2018). Second, if the FSA reduces the requirement, LHD life extension 
and conversion may not be required to meet the large deck amphibious fleet size when 
compared to current LHD decommissioning and LHA construction planning. 
In the third scenario, the number of ships required remains the same. In this case, 
the Navy has the option to either convert steam-powered LHDs or to decommission LHDs 
at the current 40-year service life and replace them with the America-class Flight 1. If the 
Navy chooses the latter, then this thesis recommends that the current LHA Flight 1 
production schedule be expedited to meet changing demand as well as reduce production 
costs incurred via the long production break. 
FOLLOW-ON STUDIES 
The results of a CBA can yield changes to policies, operations, and procedures. 
These changes can cause unintended second- and third-order effects. Therefore, policy 
changes should be carefully analyzed before implementation. This thesis also recommends 
that future research be conducted in the following areas: LHD 1–4 stability modifications, 
steam infrastructure dependability reduction, engineering plant and shipyard maintenance 
reductions, and base case estimation of the FBCF for the LHD 1 class ship. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I introduces the problem this thesis intends to solve. The scope of this thesis 
is limited to the research questions and purpose stated herein. This chapter is written to 
highlight the fact that this type of conversion has never had a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
performed by the U.S. Navy and that the Navy is extending hull lifetimes due to fleet 
expansion. An outline of the organization of the rest of the thesis is also provided. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Steam propulsion powered Wasp-class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships 1–7 
serve as the majority “big-deck” amphibious assault ships in the U.S. Navy. Unlike the 
currently commissioned America-class Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA), LHD 1–7 have 
a submersible well deck, which is utilized to launch amphibious craft in support of U.S. 
Marine Corps operations. Steam LHDs, however, utilize an aging steam propulsion system 
that yields poor underway fuel economy, increased pier-side utility consumption, and 
increased manning compared to their gas turbine counterparts USS Makin Island (LHD 8), 
USS America (LHA 6), and USS Tripoli (LHA 7). Additionally, continued reliance on 
steam-powered LHD-class ships is expected well past 2030 due to lifetime extensions as 
well as production gaps in the America-class program. 
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. 
No. 115-91, stated that “it shall be the policy of the United States to have available, as soon 
as practicable, not fewer than 355 battle force ships, comprised of the optimal mix of 
platforms, with funding subject to the availability of appropriations or other funds” (p. 
267). The most recent response to the NDAA’s 355-ship policy is the Report to Congress 
on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2020 
(Office of the Chief of Naval Operations [OPNAV], 2019a), published in March 2019. 
This report discusses, in part, both the short-term and long-term construction and disposal 
plans for U.S. Navy ships. Considering LHD hulls specifically, the planned 
decommissioning of LHD 1 will not commence until Fiscal Year (FY) 2029, while LHD 7 
is slated to decommission in FY 2046. 
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Furthermore, in his last statement before the House Committee on Appropriations, 
the 31st Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John M. Richardson, stated, “An ongoing 
force structure assessment will conclude by the end of 2019. While data-driven analysis 
may ultimately change the details of our long-term fleet architecture, all force structure 
analyses agree in one respect: we must build a bigger Navy” (OPNAV, 2019b, p. 6). The 
implications of this strategic guidance show that the Navy plans to increase the size of its 
surface force. 
Although fleet size requirements are increasing along with the age of propulsion 
plants, relatively little has been done to identify the costs and benefits of converting LHD 
1–7 to a more advanced, fuel-efficient propulsion platform (Gingras, Scarborough, 
Howard, & McCleery, 1998). Previous studies have analyzed the feasibility of conversion, 
of which the primary and most technically relevant concluded that converting LHD 7 
before commissioning to a combined diesel-electric and gas (CODLAG) was feasible 
(Gingras et al., 1998). However, the conversion was not accomplished. Additionally, a 
complex overhaul (COH) plan is being proposed for LHD 1–8 that will extend LHD 
lifetimes from 40 years to 50 years, as seen in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Notional LHD COH Timeline. Adapted from Navy 
Amphibious Warfare Branch (OPNAV N953; 2018). 
Due to both the timing of the COHs and the optimal time to perform the CODLAG 
conversion, as well as the time remaining before disposal (i.e., how to optimize the ship’s 
remaining time after CODLAG conversion), each ship will have inherent differences in 
lifetime cost savings. Additionally, it is assumed that the conversion will be completed 
during the time each ship is undergoing its proposed COH period; therefore, this thesis 
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utilizes the full 50-year lifetime when calculating costs and benefits. Due to these factors, 
this thesis identifies the need for a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to be performed.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis completes a CBA by identifying the major cost-savings elements 
involved in converting LHD steam propulsion ships. This thesis’ primary research 
questions are as follows:  
1. What are the costs and benefits when deciding whether to convert existing 
steam-powered LHD hulls to a CODLAG propulsion system?  
2. What is the resultant net present value (NPV) for conversion?  
This thesis’ secondary research questions are as follows:  
1. What is the optimal number of steam propulsion LHDs to convert when 
considering hull lifetime and ship modification requirements?  
2. Is hybrid propulsion conversion desirable when compared to the 
construction costs of new LHA ships outfitted with well decks and hybrid 
propulsion standard?  
C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to construct a CBA that evaluates converting LHD 1–
7 to hybrid propulsion. This is accomplished by identifying the significant monetary 
benefits and comparing them to conversion costs. This thesis has identified four primary, 
quantifiable elements in cost savings that are functions of propulsion plant conversion: 
1. Underway fuel economy 
2. Not underway fuel economy 
3. Pier-side utility consumption 
4. Manning 
The cost-saving elements are then applied to the class average of LHD 1–7 and LHD 8 to 
estimate a rough order of magnitude (ROM) based on the difference between the cost of 
LHD 1–7 and LHD 8. Benefits will fluctuate per year due to inherent changes in the ship’s 
schedule, such as maintenance periods, work-up periods, and deployments. This thesis 
assumes that the sum of actual long-term conversion cost savings will be similar to the total 
sum of the yearly average.  
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These cost-savings elements are then used to study two potential courses of action 
(COAs): 
1. COA 1: Convert LHD 1–7 to CODLAG propulsion 
2. COA 2: Status quo (LHD 1–7 remain steam-powered throughout the 
remainder of their lifetimes) 
Sensitivity analysis is then performed to analyze COA 1 feasibility. It is likely, if not 
practical, that several LHDs will follow COA 2 based on their remaining lifetimes and 
potential engineering feasibility.  
Concurrently with this thesis, the Director of Expeditionary Warfare for the Chief 
of Naval Operations (Navy Amphibious Warfare Branch [OPNAV N95], 2019) is 
conducting a cost-conversion study that has identified various propulsion plant line-ups, 
including the CODLAG system found on LHD 8. The OPNAV N95 study ended the rough 
order of magnitude Phase I in May 2019 and has entered Phase II, feasibility. Therefore, 
this thesis compares the conversion cost results from Phase I with the conversion benefits 
to compute the net present value (NPV) for LHD 1–7.  
D. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. The problem, research questions, and 
purpose of the study are discussed in Chapter I. It is written to highlight both the fact that 
this type of conversion has never had a CBA performed by the U.S. Navy, as well as the 
fact that the Navy is extending hull lifetimes due to fleet expansion. The remaining chapters 
are discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Chapter II discusses the background for the LHD class, as well as the history and 
evolution of LHD propulsion. The purpose of this chapter is to reinforce the reader with 
the fundamental purposes and utilities of LHD ships and explain the benefits and inner 
workings of the CODLAG propulsion system. 
The purpose of Chapter III is to perform a literature review of the data utilized in 
this thesis. The literature review helped both to identify that the thesis was viable, in that 
the conversion was technically feasible, and to identify the four cost-savings elements that 
form the core of the CBA. Additionally, the literature review helped to organize the 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 5 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
background and to ensure that the most recent literature regarding Navy force structure 
assessment as well as Marine Commandant guidance was included in the CBA. 
The purpose of Chapter IV is to describe the methodology of the thesis. Chapter IV 
discusses the production of a CBA, the outline of data discovery and analysis methodology, 
and how the data was analyzed. Chapter IV also conducts the data portion of the literature 
review in greater detail.  
The purpose of Chapter V is to formulate the results calculated from Chapter IV 
into a broader analysis of steam-powered LHD conversion and then discuss how these 
results factor into the CBA. Chapter V tabulates the results from the four primary cost-
savings elements as compared to the conversion cost for each specific LHD’s estimated 
lifetime at both Naval Base San Diego and Naval Station Norfolk. Chapter V then conducts 
a sensitivity analysis on these results.  
Chapter VI has two purposes. First, it discusses the conclusions and 
recommendations that this thesis has derived from the results of performing the CBA. 
Second, it discusses follow-on studies recommended by the thesis that have the potential 
to both improve existing data as well as uncover potentially discovered benefits not 
identified.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
Chapter II discusses the background for both the LHD classes as well as the history 
and evolution of LHD propulsion. The purpose of this chapter is to reinforce for the reader 
the fundamental purposes and utilities of LHD ships. This chapter highlights the benefits 
and inner workings of the CODLAG propulsion system.  
A. HISTORY OF LANDING HELICOPTER DOCK PROPULSION 
Amphibious warships support the United States Marine Corps mission as a ready 
force with the ability to embark, transport, deploy, command, and support all attached 
elements (U.S. Navy, 2019b). Amphibious forces are at the center of the Navy’s multi-
mission competency with the ability to project power, maintain a presence, and provide 
humanitarian relief and other contingency operations on short notice (Forecast 
International, 2010). LHDs have been a part of every major operation the Navy has 
undertaken since its inception, often playing the role of small carriers to launch attack 
aircraft against the enemy. Furthermore, all previous LHA- and LHD-class ships employed 
steam propulsion until the revolutionary CODLAG engineering plant was designed and 
installed on LHD 8 (U.S. Navy, 2019b). 
 Transition from Steam 
The first steamships made their maiden voyage early in the 19th century, and 
several advancements throughout their lifetimes revolutionized the industry (National 
Geographic, 2011). Steam boilers with water tubes were invented, giving way to ship hulls 
made from iron rather than wood. Early paddlewheel designs were replaced with screw 
propellers, further improving efficiency. Producing steam, however, requires high 
temperatures and pressures, resulting in the requirements for double-lined and watertight 
bulkheads. By the mid-20th century, steam turbine engines had become the most efficient 
prime mover for a ship; this is the same type of propulsion on amphibious ships today 
(National Geographic, 2011). 
The steam propulsion plant used on the Wasp class is identical to the Tarawa-class 
steam turbine engines from the 1960s. Wasp-class LHDs were commissioned from 1989 
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to 2001 even though the Navy began phasing out steam systems in the 1990s due to the 
high maintenance and manning costs involved. LHD 7 was the last ship of the Wasp class 
and the last conventional steamship to be constructed by the Navy (Forecast International, 
2010). Before commissioning LHD 7, the Navy commissioned a study to analyze the 
feasibility of converting the ship from steam to gas turbine propulsion (Gingras et al., 
1998). This study concluded that converting the ship was entirely feasible and would even 
produce significant cost savings to the Navy. 
 Technological Advances Pave the Way 
The first generation of the Wasp class (LHD 1–7) has two steam turbine engines, 
which are powered by two boilers, each driving one shaft with fixed propellers. The 
engines can cross-connect to drive the other shaft. Five ship service turbine generators 
provide power, with auxiliary power provided through two diesel engine generators 
(Forecast International, 2010). This aging technology is not as efficient as modern 
propulsion systems. As a result, steam is considered too labor-intensive and requires too 
many maintenance hours to fit into the current Navy fiscal environment (Dalton, T., 
Boughner, A., Mako, D., & Doerry, 2008). 
In an attempt to modernize the fleet, an early study into the conversion of LHD 7 
suggested employing one gas turbine per shaft; however, this suggestion was quickly 
identified as unappealing due to “unattractive low-speed fuel efficiency” (Hatcher, Oswald, 
& Boughner, 2002, p. 2). Additionally, Hatcher et al. (2002) found that the Navy’s desire 
to remove all steam-producing equipment during conversion led to an increase in power 
generation requirements due to new electric heating systems. This requirement eventually 
resulted in the concept of a low-speed electric propulsion system powered by an electric 
propulsion motor. Hatcher et al. also stated that “independent cost studies indicate a 
payback period of less than two years versus the design with no electric propulsion and a 
predicted life cycle fuel savings of over $21 million dollars” (Hatcher et at., 2002, p. 3).  
At this point, conversion became a much more viable option, and the Navy stated 
the intent to outfit the next LHD ship with a gas turbine propulsion and all-electric auxiliary 
systems in place of a steam plant (Dalton et al., 2008). Since the 1970s, the Navy had been 
operating General Electric LM2500 engines, which were first used on the Spruance-class 
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destroyers and rated at 21,000 bhp. The engines have evolved to a higher rating of 32,000 
bhp and are now used on the Military Sealift Command ships. Based on the LM2500, 
General Electric designed the LM2500+ by adding a stage to increase the airflow and 
temperature of the engine. The LM2500+ has a 25% power increase from the original 
turbine. The new engine made it possible to have a propulsion plant powered by only one 
gas turbine per shaft with the inclusion of an auxiliary electric motor to improve efficiency 
at lower speeds. All the technological advances yielded a new type of propulsion system 
(Hatcher et al., 2002).  
B. COMBINED DIESEL-ELECTRIC AND GAS PROPULSION 
The engineering plant configuration was deemed the CODLAG propulsion system, 
a revolutionary design that allowed the Navy to advance propulsion technology towards 
higher efficiency and responsiveness. When integrated with a higher capacity electrical 
distribution system, CODLAG gives the equipped platform an edge in employing high 
voltage equipment and weapons. 
 System Requirements 
Early designs to convert LHD 7 into a CODLAG ship called for two loitering 
motors rated at 800 bhp each for a total of 1,600 bhp per shaft (Gingras et al., 1998). 
However, Gingras et al. identified that there were concerns that these motors were not 
going to provide the necessary power outputs. A solution to this problem was to employ a 
4160V electrical production and distribution system, which can provide power to an 
electric motor that meets required performance specifications. 
In an American Society of Naval Engineers (ASNE) report titled LHD 8: A Step 
Toward the All-Electric Warship (Dalton et al., 2008), the authors discussed the expected 
total ownership costs (TOC) savings and go on to list the design, construction costs, and 
constraints placed on the design: 
In preparation for the design and construction of LHD 8, the Navy initiated 
a series of feasibility studies aimed at developing a gas turbine propulsion 
concept and reducing Total Ownership Costs (TOC) over the expected 40-
year service life of the ship. Early results of this study showed that TOC 
could be drastically reduced simply through the predicted reduction in crew 
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size of at least 80 personnel and decreased maintenance requirements 
associated with the removal of steam turbine engines and boilers. To 
minimize design and construction costs, a number of constraints were 
placed on the design: 
• Maintain the existing shaft line rake and skew of the steam propulsion 
plant to retain the same Wasp (LHD 1) class hull hydrodynamic 
characteristics 
• Limit design changes to the second stage of the reduction gear to 
maintain the manufacturing lead time needed to support the ship 
construction schedule 
• No Marine Corps missions could be degraded 
• Minimize the impact to adjacent non-machinery spaces and 
• Allow only reasonable machinery arrangement changes. (Dalton et al., 
2008, p. 3) 
 The Combined Diesel-Electric and Gas Design 
The Navy analyzed several design iterations considering the endurance, efficiency, 
and feasibility of combining gas turbines and electric motors with the existent reduction 
gears (Dalton et al., 2008). The Navy eventually decided to construct LHD 8 using an 
LM2500+ engine rated at 35,000 bhp with a variable speed electric motor rated at 5,000 
bhp for each shaft. The two were coupled with the existing reduction gears after modifying 
the first pinion to accept the electric motor. The propellers were modified from fixed to 
controllable pitch. Power is generated by five ship service diesel generators and distributed 
over a 4160V distribution system. The electrical distribution system can provide all the 
power necessary to operate the two electric motors, also known as auxiliary propulsion 
motors (APMs), for speeds up to 12 knots. This allows the ship to achieve greater fuel 
efficiency. Once speeds higher than 12 knots are required, the LM2500+ gas turbine 
engines (GTEs) are used (Naval Sea Systems Command [NAVSEA], 2016). Figure 2 
shows the power train arrangement for LHD 8 and follow-on ships. 
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Figure 2. Conceptual Diagram of Shaft Propulsion Power Train 
Arrangement for LHD 8. Source: Dalton et al. (2008).   
Propulsion may be provided by either GTEs or APMs, but not both at the same time 
(Dalton et al., 2008). The GTEs can drive one shaft at a time, also known as trail-shaft, to 
a maximum speed of 18 knots. Using both GTEs to drive both shafts simultaneously, also 
known as full power, renders the maximum speed of 20 knots. The APMs must operate 
both shafts simultaneously. Every time the ship has to go faster than 12 knots or slow below 
12 knots, it must transition from APMs to GTEs or vice versa, a fully automated process. 
The Navy successfully implemented the CODLAG design on the USS Makin 
Island (LHD 8), which was commissioned in 2009, and tested it on her maiden deployment 
in 2012. Although there are no more LHDs being built, America-class ships share the same 
propulsion plant, electrical distribution, and auxiliary systems designed and built for LHD 
8. The America-class (Flight 0 LHAs) have evolved into small aircraft carriers optimized 
for aviation operations with no well deck. However, the Flight 1 of the America-class will 
“reincorporate a well deck to enhance expeditionary warfighting capabilities while 
maintaining the principal aviation characteristics of the Flight 0 via a reduced island” (U.S. 
Navy, 2019b, p. 5), effectively returning to the LHD 8 design.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review performed to construct this thesis is broken down into distinct 
categories based on the timeline of LHD conversion literature. First, historical conversion 
literature is discussed. This literature mainly focuses on the feasibility of conversion vice 
the cost-estimation. Second, cost-savings literature and data sources are discussed, 
including fuel consumption and performance data from steam propulsion LHDs as well as 
LHD 8. Finally, current considerations for LHD conversion are discussed, namely, the 
study being performed by OPNAV N95 (2019).  
A. HISTORICAL CONVERSION FEASIBILITY AND COST SAVINGS 
Converting steam-powered LHD hulls to hybrid propulsion is not a new discussion 
topic for the U.S. Navy. The primary study that analyzed the feasibility of installing gas 
turbine propulsion and all-electric auxiliaries into the current LHD hull form, Work Task 
Assignment (WTA) 17, did not discuss the impacts to out-of-plant spaces, nor did it 
altogether remove the need for steam on the ship (Gingras et al., 1998). WTA 17.1, the 
follow-on study to WTA 17, addressed the need for total steam removal as well as the 
conversion to all-electric auxiliaries (Gingras et al., 1998).  
In September 1998, a study titled Gas Turbine Propulsion Installation LHD 7 
(WTA 2204–024) was performed to explore, in a high level of fidelity, the viability of 
installing and converting LHD 7 to hybrid propulsion and all-electric auxiliaries during 
initial ship construction (Gingras et al., 1998). This study researched similar equipment 
and designs that were eventually utilized in the USS Makin Island (LHD 8); however, the 
conversion was not performed for LHD 7. For this thesis, the Gas Turbine Propulsion 
Installation study is referenced as the primary research proving conversion feasibility as 
well as the basis for choosing the four cost-savings elements, which are discussed later in 
more detail.  
Gas Turbine Propulsion Installation (Gingras et al., 1998) accomplished many new 
milestones during its conversion review. Firstly, the study extensively examined all of the 
systems required to be installed or modified, including the engineering plant (gas turbines 
with required ducting systems and machinery room arrangements), electric plant (diesel 
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generators and 450V alternatives), machinery control systems, and auxiliary systems to 
support plant operation (notably seawater, freshwater, and lube oil). The study also 
identified the resulting impacts, if any, and discussed what would be required to facilitate 
a conversion. This thesis utilized those requirements to ensure that plant conversion would 
be feasible.  
Secondly, Gas Turbine Propulsion Installation (Gingras et al., 1998) identified the 
major cost-savings elements this thesis ultimately employs for further analysis. Manpower 
savings were estimated to be $214 million in FY 1998 due to a reduction of 88 sailors, 
while endurance calculations noted a reduction in fuel consumption for gas turbines in a 
wide range of ship operations (Gingras et al., 1998). In addition to Gas Turbine Propulsion 
Installation, this thesis also identified in-port utility consumption as a potential cost-
savings factor, which was not identified in the study. In-port utilities are now possible to 
investigate due to LHD 8 producing useable data for over ten years, which was not possible 
during the period in which Gas Turbine Propulsion Installation was being written. In 
addition to Gas Turbine Propulsion Installation, a 2001 study titled LHD-8 Conversion 
Manpower Impact Analysis reviewed Gas Turbine Propulsion Installation and determined 
that it “correctly estimated the manpower reduction achievable from the conversion” 
(NAVSEA, 2001, p. 9).  
Hatcher et al. (2002) presented a conference paper titled U.S. Navy Large Deck 
Amphibious Assault Ship: Steam to Gas Turbine Conversion. This paper, using data 
provided from Gas Turbine Propulsion Installation as well as newly provided information, 
determined that converting the LHD hull to gas turbine propulsion would “greatly reduce 
crew size and operating costs” (Hatcher et al., 2002, p. 10). This study also discussed 
propulsion plant design history, potential issues faced with conversion, and references the 
designs that are utilized in LHD 8, including the first-ever application of the LM2500+ gas 
turbine engine in a U.S. Navy ship.  
To improve the understanding of the cost-savings elements identified by this thesis 
for LHD 8, a 2012 LHD 8 maiden deployment report titled USS Makin Island: 
Transforming the Fleet (USS Makin Island [LHD 8], 2012) was analyzed to review 
previously generated, empirically determined data. This report detailed a hybrid propulsion 
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overview, which showed a $15 million FY 2012 fuel cost savings of LHD 8 compared to 
LHD 4 during the six-month deployment. The report also noted that the manning “does not 
meet maintenance demand” (USS Makin Island [LHD 8], 2012, p. 6) for LHD 8, which 
may help explain future manning increases, and thus a reduction in cost savings for 
manpower in follow-on years. Furthermore, this report was also able to compare the 
predicted fuel economy against real-life fuel economy for both gas turbines as well as the 
electric drive motor. The result was improved performance over what was initially 
estimated. 
Although not a U.S. Navy ship conversion, the U.S. Air Force has been conducting 
studies on replacing its B-52 fleet with a new, upgraded engine since 1996 (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 
2004). The first three studies conducted found that re-engining was not economically 
feasible, namely, due to using a constant fuel price determined solely by the DLA energy 
price. Newer studies, however, have determined that not considering the associated costs 
in addition to DLA standard fuel prices, which are considered to be burdened costs of 
delivery, results in an underestimation of the economic value of re-engining, and these 
studies are now recommending the Air Force proceed in conversion without delay. Thus, 
this thesis has reviewed and determined that the cost of delivering fuel to ships is integral, 
in addition to the DLA standard energy price, which must be determined and considered in 
an analysis. Further discussion on fully burdened cost is found in Chapter III.  
B. COST-SAVINGS DATA COLLECTION 
After identifying the four cost-savings elements, this thesis performed data 
collection by researching numerous DOD cost databases, including the Naval Center for 
Cost Analysis (NCCA), Defense Cost and Research Center (DCARC), and operation and 
support databases including the Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support 
Costs (VAMOSC). For fuel cost savings, this thesis utilizes VAMOSC as the source for 
all fuel consumption data. Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, & Weimer (2010) is utilized as 
the source for constructing the CBA. For manpower savings, VAMOSC is utilized for 
historical data, while the Ship Manpower Document (SMD) for LHD 1–7 and LHD 8 were 
applied to calculate theoretical cost savings using the DOD composite pay rates. In-port 
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cost savings were collected via the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC). 
All the data is calculated in or converted to FY 2019 dollars. Future cost-savings data is 
then adjusted for inflation (manpower and in-port utilities) or modeled for changes in cost 
(fuel). The methodology section discusses each one of these cost-savings elements in 
intricate detail.  
C. CURRENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR LHD CONVERSION 
In order to analyze current considerations in the feasibility and cost of LHD 
conversion, this thesis reviewed reports on the current state of LHD conversion, the current 
state of U.S. Navy shipbuilding, as well as the current state of technology (Dalton et al., 
2008; Forecast International, 2019; Naval Power and Energy Systems [NPES], 2019; 
OPNAV N95, 2019). This thesis utilizes the OPNAV N953 (2018) complex overhaul 
(COH) report discussed in Chapter I to establish a timeline of potential conversion. The 
purpose of using this report is to identify the potential dates available for conversion, as 
well as what systems the COH is upgrading, and thus the number of potential cost savings 
possible. The preliminary reports have stated that various components of the steam 
propulsion, namely main propulsion boilers, the main feed system, and ship service turbine 
generators, will require an overhaul, and therefore would be identified as cost-savings 
elements if conversion is approved (since they are subsequently removed). The current FY 
2019 estimated overhaul cost of the significant steam system overhauls mentioned 
previously is $27 million.  
The primary study that is used to determine the cost factors is the OPNAV N95 
(2019) propulsion study titled Propulsion Options Study For LHD 1 Class Ships. Although 
this report has not yet been published, this thesis analyzes the following preliminary 
findings:  
1. Conversion cost estimates 
2. Study assumptions and approach 
3. Conversion impacts on weight and stability  
4. Risks associated with conversion 
This thesis compares the ROM findings from Phase I of this study to conduct the CBA. 
Further discussion on CBA is found in Chapter IV.  
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A 2019 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report titled An Analysis of the Navy’s 
Fiscal Year 2019 Shipbuilding Plan was utilized to better understand the requirements of 
maintaining LHD-class ships for an extended lifetime and the current state of the LHA 
(LHD replacement), and thus provide a reason to (i.e., have standing to) convert. The CBO 
report concluded: 
Under the 2019 plan, a seven-year gap separates that ship and the next one, 
slated to be purchased in 2024, which in CBO’s estimation would 
effectively eliminate any manufacturing learning gleaned from building the 
first 3 ships of the class. As a result, CBO’s estimate is higher than the 
Navy’s, at $3.9 billion per ship. (CBO, 2019, p. 26). 
Due to the expected cost increase reported by the CBO, this thesis determined that if 
conversion costs are outweighed by the benefits (cost savings), the Navy should give 
standing in the process of conversion. Namely, the conversion may, in the long-term, 
reduce the lifetime costs of the LHD class, which may result in the ability to transfer the 
cost savings onto future programs such as LHA construction.  
In addition to analyzing if LHD conversion has standing and how the conversion 
can be coordinated with the COH timeline, this thesis also analyzed the 2019 Naval Power 
and Energy Systems (NPES) report titled Naval Power and Energy Systems Technology 
Development Roadmap: The Navy Power & Energy Leap Forward. This report provides 
another reason why conversion may have standing: improving legacy power systems with 
next-generation systems capable of utilizing “directed energy weapons such as lasers and 
stochastic electronic warfare systems radiated energy systems such as the Air and Missile 
Defense Radar, and advances in kinetic energy weapons, including electro-magnetic 
railguns” (NPES, 2019, p. 5). Steam-powered LHDs still rely on legacy 450V systems, 
which are limited in capability when comparing newer systems such as the 4160V electric 
plant on LHD 8. As a result, this thesis determined that by converting to hybrid propulsion, 
and as a result upgrading the electric plants on converted ships, there may be notable 
national defense benefits found in the application of the advanced energy systems 
discussed (NPES, 2019).  
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
Chapter IV discusses how the thesis develops the CBA, as well as how the data is 
processed and analyzed. The outline section is utilized as a faster reference due to the length 
of the data analysis section. Additionally, the methodology dives further into a literature 
review of the data sources, discussing how each of the cost-savings elements was obtained 
and analyzed. Finally, this section discusses the limitations this thesis had on the data 
analysis. 
A. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
A cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a helpful tool for decision-makers in any 
profession. Boardman et al. (2010) state that “the broad purpose of CBA is to help social 
decision making and to make it more rational. More specifically, the objective is to have a 
more efficient allocation of society’s resources” (p. 2). 
The two principal types of CBAs are ex-ante and ex-post, where ex-ante analysis 
(the standard CBA) analyzes a project that is under consideration, and an ex-post analysis 
analyzes a project at completion. For this thesis, all CBA discussion is completed utilizing 
an ex-ante CBA approach.  
The benefit a CBA provides to a government program, such as LHD ship 
conversion, is that it allows for the analysis of benefits from competing alternatives where 
a policy decision must be made. This thesis utilizes the standard for performing CBA on 
government programs, Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost 
Analysis of Federal Programs, produced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB, 
1992). Circular A-94 states that “The goal of this Circular is to promote efficient resource 
allocation through well-informed decision-making by the Federal Government. It provides 
general guidance for conducting benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness analyses” (OMB, 
1992, pp. 2–3).  
This thesis addresses the nine steps of a CBA by over-valuing costs while under-
valuing benefits to develop a conservative net present value (NPV) estimate. The results of 
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the CBA can be directly employed by policymakers to make decisions on whether or not 
to convert LHDs.  
 Steps of a Cost-Benefit Analysis 
In order to lay the foundation of a CBA, the nine steps are briefly explained per 
Boardman et al. (2010). Some steps also relate the LHD conversion to the discussion 
Boardman et al. introduce, while other steps are more general due to further discussion in 
the following chapters. 
a. Specify the Set of Alternative Projects 
In order to complete step one, all alternative projects must be identified. This thesis 
is only concerned with the cost-benefits of conversion to one specific propulsion plant, 
CODLAG, as compared to maintaining the status quo (steam propulsion).  
b. Decide Whose Benefits and Costs Count (Standing) 
Step two analyzes whose costs and benefits from the project are most important or 
relevant. This thesis has identified that standing involves the relationship between the 
taxpayers and the government that will be completing the conversion. The taxpayers have 
standing due to the potential monetary gain from conversion. The government has standing 
due to having control of the ships, as well as gaining from conversion benefits (such as 
improved fuel efficiency) as well as the cost of having to budget the money.  
c. Identify the Impact Categories, Catalog Them, and Select Measurement 
Indicators  
Step three identifies the impacts or inputs and outputs that the project contains. The 
benefit impact categories for LHD conversion are mainly found in the cost savings of 
conversion. These impacts, which were identified in Chapter I, are fuel savings, manpower 
savings, and in-port utility savings. Additionally, there are inherent benefits that are related, 
or directly derived from, the main benefit impact categories, such as longer time on station 
before refueling, less frequent evolutions involving refueling, an updated and more 
efficient propulsion system that should require fewer maintenance hours and parts, and 
reduced emissions from converted ships.  
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The cost impact categories for LHD conversion are conversion costs (the most 
extensive cost and one that is required upfront), research and development costs of 
conversion (OPNAV N95, 2019), time spent converting ships (which may impact the time 
the ship could be on mission), and unknown factors that will arise after converting a steam 
propulsion ship to a hybrid system for the first time in U.S. Navy history.  
d. Predict the Impacts Quantitatively Over the Life of the Project 
The purpose of step four is to have the analyst develop a strategy that best estimates 
the long-term costs of the project. In the case of LHD conversion, benefits over ship life 
will have to outweigh the upfront conversion cost for the project to be beneficial. This 
means that any converted LHD will have to have enough active service time following 
conversion to ensure the appropriate amount of benefits are received. This thesis uses both 
the current estimated time that conversion may happen as well as the cost savings per year, 
which can be discounted to present value (PV) to determine project viability.  
e. Monetize (Attach Dollar Values to) All Impacts  
In order to understand the relationship between cost and benefit in the CBA, each 
of the impact categories must be monetized (given a value in dollars) for comparison. This 
thesis can monetize the main benefit categories of fuel, manpower, and in-port utility 
consumption savings; however, it is unable to monetize derivative benefits such as national 
defense and maintenance savings associated with conversion. Additionally, the cost of 
conversion is monetized through the OPNAV N95 study.  
f. Discount Benefits and Costs to Obtain Present Values 
The purpose of step six is to “aggregate the benefits and costs that arise in different 
years” (Boardman et al., 2010, p. 12). This is done by discounting the future benefits and 
costs to PV, allowing for a better understanding of the opportunity costs involved in 
performing the project. Present value is determined by calculating the benefits and costs, 
where t is the time the benefit or cost is inherited, and s is the social discount rate for the 
project (Boardman et al., 2010). 
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Social discount rates (SDR) should be chosen such that they are appropriate for the project. 
For government programs, the social discount rate is derived from OMB Circular A-94 
(1992) for internal government investment. This thesis uses the nominal 30-year SDR of 
3.6% found in OMB Circular A-94 Appendix C (2018) because the cost and benefits 
discussed are solely borne by the government. Additionally, this thesis uses SDR based on 
current nominal treasury rates to perform sensitivity analysis.  
g. Compute the Net Present Value of Each Alternative 
The NPV is the difference between the PV of the benefits and the PV of the costs. 
A project is typically only considered when the PV of the benefits is larger than the PV of 
the costs for projects like LHD conversion since it is a single alternative project (convert 
or maintain status quo). Therefore, LHD conversion should only occur if the NPV is 
positive.  
h. Perform Sensitivity Analysis  
Due to the uncertainty in calculating long-term benefits, especially in a project such 
as LHD conversion, where fuel prices behave unpredictably, sensitivity analysis aims to 
address these uncertainties. This thesis performs a full sensitivity analysis in Chapter V. In 
addition to NPV as the CBA decision rule, this thesis utilizes inflation-adjusted costs and 
benefits, along with nominal interest rates in order to produce final, consistently quantified 
numbers. Inflation-adjusted impacts were determined to be a more conservative estimation 
due to each ship being converted throughout a long time span, with funding not occurring 
until close to the conversion date. 
i. Make a Recommendation 
All CBAs require analysts to determine the NPV of a project, then make their 
recommendation whether the project should go forward. For this thesis, LHD conversion 
is only recommended if there is a positive NPV. This requires that the full cost of 
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conversion be known, along with the cost of performing the research and development 
study. Once this data is available, the information provided by this thesis can be used to 
finalize the PV of costs and determine the NPV.  
B. GENERAL APPROACH IN IDENTIFYING COST-SAVINGS ELEMENTS 
Chapter I, Section I.C, identified the four main cost-savings elements this thesis is 
investigating. The procedure developed to quantify these factors utilized various sources 
of data as well as measurement techniques that were considered best suited to each specific 
cost-savings factor. This procedure was developed as follows: 
1. Identify the primary cost-savings factors that will be seen directly 
following the conversion of steam-powered LHDs 
• Literature review 
• On-site ship tours on both steam-powered LHDs as well as LHD 8 
• Ships Manpower Document (SMD) 
2. Select the most feasible naval stations for analysis 
3. Collect data applicable to the previously identified cost-savings factors 
and provide observations and recommendations from analysis 
4. Collect underway and in-port steaming fuel economy data and analyze  
• Utilize Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
(VAMOSC) database for historical cost 
• Identify the best approach for normalizing data 
• Analyze relevant time segments for both propulsion types 
• Develop a method to predict future cost 
• Report the cost savings as both yearly savings from FY 2019 
through 2050 as well as cost savings for specific hull lifetime 
5. Collect pier-side utility consumption data and analyze 
• Utilize Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) 
databases at both San Diego and Norfolk for historical cost 
• Identify the best approach for normalizing data 
• Analyze all data collected and predict future cost by utilizing the 
Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) Joint Inflation Calculator 
(JIC) Operations and Maintenance (O&M) for purchases’ inflation 
rate 
• Report the cost savings as both yearly savings from FY 2019 
through 2050 as well as cost savings for specific hull lifetime 
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6. Collect manpower data and analyze 
• Utilize SMD for LHD 1–7 as well as LHD-8 for the class cost 
• Utilize VAMOSC database for historical cost 
• Identify the best approach for normalizing data 
• Analyze data and predict future cost by utilizing the NCCA JIC 
Military Pay only (OSD Cost Escalation Element)  
• Report the cost-savings as both yearly savings from FY 2019 
through 2050 as well as cost savings for specific hull lifetime 
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
The purpose of the data analysis section is to provide the basis for how each of the 
cost-savings elements was calculated. Analysis of the data is provided in follow-on 
chapters. Data received from the Navy’s VAMOSC database was interpreted with the help 
of the VAMOSC user manual for ships, version 18.2 (U.S. Navy, 2019a).  
 Fuel Economy Data 
The Navy’s VAMOSC system was used to provide historical fuel data for LHD 1–
8. LHD 1–7 utilized a 20-year (1999–2018) period in order to establish a class baseline, 
whereas LHD 8 utilized all available data since commissioning (2010–2017). Due to being 
in-port for all of 2018, no fuel economy data was generated for LHD 8 during that time. 
The data was then aggregated into tables by year, which is displayed in Appendix D. 
VAMOSC receives its fuel data from the Standard Accounting and Reporting 
System, which comes from both the Defense Finance and Accounting Service as well as 
the Navy Energy Usage Reporting System (NEURS). These systems are reported via the 
Fleet Commander monthly. Steaming hours are reported to VAMOSC via NEURS and are 
broken down into the sub-elements of steaming underway, steaming not underway, and 
cold iron. Underway fuel consumption is defined as diesel fuel marine (DFM) consumed 
while underway for propulsion and regular ship service, while not underway is defined as 
DFM consumed while not underway for propulsion and regular ship service (U.S. Navy, 
2019a). Not underway for propulsion is also called auxiliary steaming, or “aux steaming.” 
For consistency, the term “not underway” is used throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
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Fuel consumption was calculated via the method described in the VAMOSC user 
manual (U.S. Navy, 2019a), which involves dividing fuel consumption in barrels (BBL) 
by the number of hours underway and not underway.  
BBL Number Barrels ConsumedFuel Economy ( ) = 
hr Hours of Operation
 
This was done for both underway as well as not underway consumption during each year 
of LHD 1–8 operation and is included in Appendix D with the aggregated yearly data 
discussed previously. The purpose of this calculation method is to normalize the 
differences between ship schedules throughout the year of operation. If only yearly BBL 
consumption were considered, there would be an inherent deviation from the average due 
to ship schedule differences. Finally, each year of fuel economy data was averaged per 
LHD to determine eight ship-specific, lifetime average fuel economies for both underway 
and not underway operation. In addition to the ship-specific averages, an LHD 1–7 class 
average was established for fuel calculations when determining fuel usage cost savings of 
steam-powered LHDs compared to LHD 8. The results of the fuel economy averages are 
displayed in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. LHD 1–8 Average Fuel Economy Calculations. Adapted 
from U.S. Navy (2019b). 
When analyzing the yearly fuel consumption data, this thesis identified that LHD 
1–7 data has a relatively low deviation from the mean for both underway and not underway. 
During LHD 8 analysis, however, it was noticed that 2014 not underway BBL consumption 
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did not correlate with any previous year, resulting in extremely high fuel consumption. Due 
to the high uncertainty of the legitimacy of this data point, 2014 was not included in the 
final average for not underway fuel economy. This was the only data point rejected for 
establishing class averages.  
In order to determine the underway cost savings of LHD 8 as compared to the LHD 
1–7 class average, the average amount of fuel consumed (in BBL) per year must be 
determined. Therefore, fuel consumption ratios must be multiplied by the average hours 
underway in a year. For LHD 1–7, the class-average hours underway were established 
using the same method as the class average for fuel economy. First, each ship’s yearly 
underway hours were averaged. Finally, an LHD 1–7 class average was established by 
averaging the ship specific underway hours. For LHD 8, all available years of underway 
operation (2010–2017) were averaged to determine average hours underway. These results 
are displayed in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. LHD 1–8 Average Hours Underway. Adapted from U.S. 
Navy (2019b). 
The result of the average hours underway calculations shows that LHD 8 has spent, on 
average, fewer hours underway as compared to the LHD 1–7 class average. This is likely 
the result of reduced hours of operation (as compared to the class average) following the 
years directly after commissioning.  
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The combined LHD 1–7 average hours underway were then multiplied by the fuel 
economy numbers for LHD 1–7 to determine BBLs consumed in one year. LHD 8 fuel 
consumption was determined by multiplying average hours underway for LHD 8 by the 
average fuel economy for LHD 8. Both calculations were performed as shown in the 
following equation. 
BBL BBLBarrels Fuel Consumed Underway ( ) = Avg Fuel Economy ( ) x Avg Yearly Hours Underway
yr hr
  
The result for LHD 8 was subtracted from LHD 1–7 to determine the total average number 
of BBLs saved in a year of underway LHD operation utilizing LHD 8 CODLAG 
propulsion.  
In order to determine the not underway cost savings of LHD 8 as compared to the 
LHD 1–7 class average, the same method as underway fuel consumption was employed. 
LHD 1–7 not underway hours were averaged to establish a class average, while LHD 8 not 
underway hours were averaged separately. These results are displayed in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. LHD 1–8 Average Hours Not Underway. Adapted from 
U.S. Navy (2019). 
Results from the not underway hours’ calculations show LHD 8 spent approximately half 
of the time in not underway status. This is not due to schedule differences, but rather due 
to the inherent plant design of LHD 8. Steam plants require long start-up times and are 
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usually lit off one or more days before an underway. LHD 8’s CODLAG propulsion system 
does not require this early light-off time, and thus this result is as expected.  
The LHD 1–7 class average, as well as the LHD 8 average, was then multiplied by 
the fuel economy averages to determine average BBLs consumed in one year not 
underway, shown in the following equation. 
BBL BBLBarrels Fuel Consumed Not Underway ( ) = Avg Fuel Economy ( ) x Avg Yearly Hours Not Underway
yr hr   
The result for LHD 8 was subtracted from LHD 1–7 to determine the total average number 
of BBLs saved in a year of not underway LHD operation utilizing LHD 8 CODLAG 
propulsion.  
Once both underway and not underway BBLs saved were determined, the cost 
savings were calculated for each using the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) F-76 standard 
fuel price of $126.00 FY 2019 for petroleum products, effective October 1, 2018 (Norquist, 
2018). Due to the high volatility of fuel prices, this thesis determined it impractical to adjust 
each follow-on year after 2019 by inflation. Therefore, this thesis employs the instruction 
of the future fuel pricing model introduced in NAVSEA’s (2012) Design Data Sheet (DDS) 
200–2, Calculation of Surface Ship Annual Energy Usage, Annual Energy Cost, and Fully 
Burdened Cost of Energy. DDS 200–2 provides the use of the Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) report, which provides crude oil 
price predictions for a reference case (expected case), as well as high- and low-price cases. 
DDS 200–2 provides the following guidelines for future pricing: 
The great volatility of crude oil prices (AEO 2011 shows a 4 to 1 ratio of 
the long-term high oil price to low oil price projections) suggests that a 
simple projection of fuel price in the future will not be sufficient to gain the 
insight needed for many decisions. If better insight is needed, the impact of 
the variability of crude oil prices can be accounted for in several ways 
including: 
a. Use the current DLA Energy price as a baseline, then show the impact of 
varying this amount both upwards and downwards to reflect the anticipated 
volatility 
b. Use the AEO to predict future DLA Energy prices for the baseline, high 
price and low price to reflect the volatility 
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c. Use the AEO to develop a stochastic model of the DLA Energy price as 
a function of year. (NAVSEA, 2012, p. 12) 
Following DDS 200–2 (NAVSEA, 2012), this thesis utilizes option c, or the DLA 
price of $126.00 FY 2019, as well as the AEO predictions of crude oil prices for years 2020 
through 2050. The model adjusts the DLA standard fuel price by the percent change in 
crude oil price for both underway and not underway operations to determine the actual cost 
of fuel per year in FY 2019 dollars. The model output is displayed in Figure 6, starting at 
the FY 2019 DLA standard energy price of $126.00.  
 
Figure 6. EIA Model to Predict DLA Fuel Price Change from 2020 
to 2050. Adapted from EIA (2019). 
The DLA standard fuel price, however, does not consider the fuel burden cost 
associated with delivering the fuel to U.S. Navy ships. The fuel burden cost referred to as 
the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) is a component of the Fully Burdened Cost of 
Energy (FBCE), a topic introduced in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 
FY 2009. The FBCE consists of both the cost burden of delivering the fuel to ships (FBCF) 
as well as the fully burdened cost of electricity (shore power). Electricity costs are 
discussed in Chapter IV, Section C.2.b. The NDAA for FY 2009 defines the FBCF as “the 
commodity price for fuel plus the total cost of all personnel and assets required to move 
and, when necessary, protect the fuel from the point at which the fuel is received from the 
commercial supplier to the point of use.” 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 30 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Furthermore, the Defense Acquisition University (DAU; 2012) discusses the FBCE 
implications on defense acquisitions programs within their framework: 
FBCE, is used to inform the acquisition tradespace [sic] by quantifying the 
per gallon price of fuel (or per kilowatt price of electricity) used per day for 
two or more competing materiel solutions. The FBCE estimate includes 
apportioned costs of the energy logistics forces needed to deliver and protect 
the fuel in a scenario. Calculating the FBCE gives DOD decision makers a 
way to more accurately consider the cost of a system’s energy logistics 
footprint when making trades between cost, schedule, and performance. (p. 
1) 
In order to determine the FBCE for U.S. Navy ships, this thesis utilizes the FBCF 
cost-estimation approach introduced in NAVSEA’s (2012) Design Data Sheet (DDS) 200–
2, Calculation of Surface Ship Annual Energy Usage, Annual Energy Cost, and Fully 
Burdened Cost of Energy. DDS 200–2 considers four primary factors to calculate the 
FBCF, acquisition costs (DLA energy price), storage and handling costs, delivery costs, 
and other costs. The FBCF derivation using DLA energy prices from FY 2011 is displayed 
in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. NAVSEA Example Calculation of FBCF. Source: 
NAVSEA (2012). 
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In order to determine the current FBCF in FY 2019, the burdened cost of $46.26 FY 2011 
was adjusted for Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) inflation via the JIC index, 
resulting in $52.64 FY 2019. The FY 2019 adjusted burden amount was then added to the 
DLA standard energy price to total $178.64 FY 2019. For years 2020–2050, the inflation-
adjusted burdened cost was added to the DLA modeled price of fuel to determine a yearly 
FBCF. This process was performed for each fuel case, resulting in a yearly cost savings, 
corrected by modeled volatility, starting in 2020 and ending in 2050.  
The expected decommissioning date for LHD 7, however, is 2051. Therefore, for 
LHD 7 specifically, one additional year of the model was added by using the same percent 
change for 2050 as 2051. The EIA does not currently have a model that predicts dates past 
2050.  
 In-Port Utility Cost Savings 
This thesis focuses on the conversion cost savings for steam and electric 
consumption during in-port operations. It is assumed that conversion will accompany full-
electric auxiliaries’ conversion, similar to the engineering design of LHD 8. As a result, in-
port electric consumption (and therefore cost) is expected to increase on converted ships to 
accompany the electric auxiliaries. San Diego and Norfolk were chosen due to these 
locations being significant fleet concentration areas for LHD-class ships. Currently, LHD 
1 and LHD 7 are stationed in Sasebo, Japan, and Mayport, FL, respectively. Due to similar 
billing rates for electric between Mayport and Norfolk, this thesis did not identify the need 
to include Mayport separate from Norfolk. Therefore, LHD 7 data is reported under 
Norfolk results. Additionally, data for LHD 1 was included only before the homeport shift 
to Japan in 2018. 
a. Steam Cost Savings 
NAVFAC in San Diego and Norfolk were contacted, and each provided five years 
(2015–2019) of steam consumption data for all available ships (Raymon Leyeza and Chris 
Roberts, unpublished data, 2019). The data is metered for each ship and is reported as a 
monthly amount for each year. Due to differences in consumption, both Norfolk and San 
Diego were analyzed separately. Each ship had cost savings reported for both locations. 
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Unlike fuel data, which is recorded and billed through the same provider (see the previous 
section for details), steam utilities cannot be adjusted by simply dividing by the cold iron 
hours due to different billing locations (shipyard versus naval base). Therefore, to 
normalize the available data, this thesis averaged the monthly steam consumption (in 
MBTU) for both Norfolk and San Diego for each month of the reported FY for each of the 
five years of data. Ships that did not consume any steam in a month were not included in 
the average. The monthly average totals were then summed to produce a yearly, class-
averaged steam consumption number for both Norfolk and San Diego.  
Since each ship, on average throughout its lifetime, spends some amount of time in 
port and at sea, this thesis calculated the average hours cold iron each year (1999–2018) 
for LHD 1–7 using the same method that was employed for fuel consumption data. LHD 
8 cold iron hours are not required for steam data due to all-electric auxiliaries but are still 
included in the data for electrical analysis. The results are displayed in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Average LHD In-port Hours. Adapted from U.S. Navy 
(2019b). 
This was necessary to determine how many BTU, based on average time spent cold 
iron, an LHD uses in a year. Average steam consumption in MBTU was calculated by the 
following equation: 
MBTU Class-Average Hours Cold Iron Average MBTU YearYearly Steam Usage ( ) = ( ) x ( ) x ( )
Year Year Year 8766 Hrs
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Finally, average yearly steam consumption in MBTU was converted to a FY 2019 
dollar amount by multiplying consumption by the service billing rate in Norfolk and San 
Diego. Analysis of steam consumption data is discussed in Chapter V. One notable 
difference for steam utilities is the cost of the steam for San Diego and Norfolk. The FY 
2019 steam billing rate in San Diego is $297.82/MBTU, while the steam production price 
in Norfolk is $31.90/MBTU. 
b. Electric Cost Savings 
The Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVSURFPAC), 
as well as the Commander, Naval Surface Force, Atlantic (COMNAVSURFLANT), Fleet 
Energy Managers (FEM), were contacted and provided five years (2015–2019) of electric 
consumption for all available ships. The data is metered for each ship and is reported as a 
daily usage rate in kilowatt-hours (kWh) per month for each FY. Similar to the steam data, 
differences in electrical usage required Norfolk and San Diego to be reported separately. 
As a result, each ship has cost reported at both locations. NAVFAC in San Diego meters 
ships based on eight different service types: peak consumption surcharge, base 
consumption, semi-peak consumption surcharge, and non-coincident demand charge (this 
is done in winter and summer, resulting in a total of eight categories). NAVFAC in Norfolk 
reported data as one service charge per ship. 
The FBCE component for electric usage (shore power) was determined solely by 
the energy price derived from NAVFAC. NAVSEA (2012) Design Data Sheet (DDS) 200–
2, Calculation of Surface Ship Annual Energy Usage, Annual Energy Cost, and Fully 
Burdened Cost of Energy, states that “The major element of the fully burdened cost of 
shore power is the commodity price for electricity. The Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command (NAVFAC) tracks the usage and cost of electricity by naval facilities” 
(NAVSEA, 2012, p. 18). 
Therefore, the burdened cost of delivering electricity through the Navy-owned 
electrical infrastructure was determined by DDS 200–2 (NAVSEA, 2012) to be negligible 
and therefore is not included in this thesis. 
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In order to compare the two different locations, this thesis calculates the average 
daily usage rate for both LHD 1–7–class ships and LHD 8 in San Diego, as well as LHD 
1–7-class ships in Norfolk. Norfolk has never had an all-electric auxiliaries LHD- or LHA-
class ship. Therefore, the cost increase, determined by the difference in LHD 1–7 and LHD 
8 electrical consumption in San Diego, is applied in the same proportion in Norfolk. The 
daily usage rate for each location (in kWh/day) was then converted to a yearly energy usage 
rate in MWh by the following equation.  
MWh kWh 365 Day MWhAverage Electric Usage ( ) = Average Consumption ( ) x ( ) x ( )
Year Day Year 1000 kWh
  
The average electric average yearly cost was then determined by the following equation.  
$ MWh Avg Hours Cold Iron Year $Avg Electric Cost ( ) = Avg Consumption ( ) x ( ) x ( ) x Utility Rate ( )
Year Year Year 8766 Hours MWh
  
The average hours cold iron is the same for steam and electric, as seen in Figure 8. To 
allow for a direct comparison of San Diego to Norfolk, only the base consumption rate for 
San Diego was used in the equation to calculate the average electric cost. In order to 
determine the cost of electric conversion for each location, the cost of LHD 1–7 was 
subtracted from the cost of LHD 8 (LHD 8 has a higher usage), resulting in a net cost 
increase for conversion. Analysis of electric consumption data is discussed in Chapter V. 
 Manpower Data 
Two separate methods were employed to determine manpower savings: historical 
analysis utilizing the VAMOSC database (U.S. Navy, 2019a), as well as reviewing the 
Ship Manpower Document (SMD) for both ship types. The two approaches were employed 
to better understand the actual (historical) cost savings of LHD 8 as compared to what the 
Navy has determined manpower should cost, based on the SMD differences in LHD 1–7 
and LHD 8. The goal is to establish a range of all potential cost- savings in manpower for 
future sensitivity analysis. The early historical cost data (2010–2014) has been 
hypothesized to be inconsistent because LHD 8 was the first-in-class ship, and likely had 
a more extensive range in manning during the first years following commissioning.  
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a. Historical Manpower Cost Savings 
Historical analysis from VAMOSC (U.S. Navy, 2019a) was only possible using 
San Diego manpower costs since all similar CODLAG propulsion ships (LHD 8 and LHA 
6 and 7) have remained homeported in San Diego since commissioning. Additionally, due 
to homeport shifts of steam-powered LHD 2 and 6 to Sasebo, Japan, data for LHD 2 is 
analyzed between 2013 to 2018, while data from LHD 6 is analyzed between 2010 to 2011. 
Data from the year 2012 is not included for LHD 2 or 6 due to the homeport shift. This 
thesis uses the cost savings between the steam-powered ships and LHD 8 due to the 
reduction in manpower. Therefore, the cost savings is the same when comparing the cost 
of a converted ship to a steamship in the same location (the identical SMD changes are 
shared regardless of ship homeport), even though the total cost to man an LHD is higher in 
San Diego as compared to Norfolk due to basic allowance for housing (BAH), permanent 
change of station (PCS), and other factors.  
This thesis utilizes the yearly actual cost (from VAMOSC; U.S. Navy, 2019a) of 
the personnel that is analogous to the military composite standard pay and reimbursement 
rate, including basic pay, allowances (housing, sustenance, and other expenses), bonuses, 
Medicare-eligible retiree health care, retired pay accrual, PCS, and entitlements, adjusted 
to FY 2019 dollars. In order to relate the total pay to the actual manpower, VAMOSC total 
personnel numbers (officer and enlisted) were plotted from 2010 to 2018 and are displayed 
in Figure 9 and Figure 10. 
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Figure 9. Officer Manning LHD 1–7 and LHD 8. Adapted from U.S. 
Navy (2019a). 
  
Figure 10. Enlisted Manning LHD 1–7 and LHD 8. Adapted from 
U.S. Navy (2019a). 
These results show that savings in manpower have decreased for LHD 8 in years after 
commissioning. Historical cost-savings amounts are tabulated and displayed in Chapter V.  
b. Ship Manpower Document Cost Savings 
The SMD for both LHD 1–7 and LHD 8 were compared to determine the reduction 
of total personnel on LHD 8. This thesis assumes that all converted LHDs will use the same 
SMD as LHD 8. This assumption should be validated following the full cost-estimation 
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study release. Additionally, unlike the historical manpower cost savings, the SMD 
comparison utilized by this thesis presents the average cost of manpower in the Navy, vice 
the cost in San Diego alone. Figure 11 and Figure 12 display the current SMD for LHD 1–
7 and LHD 8, respectively. 
 
Figure 11. Ship Manpower Document (SMD) Manpower Summary 
for LHD 1–7. Source: Navy Manpower Analysis Center 
(2014). 
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Figure 12. Ship Manpower Document (SMD) Manpower Summary 
for LHD 8. Source: Navy Manpower Analysis Center (2015). 
The result of comparing the reduction of manpower between LHD 1–7 and LHD 8 is one 
officer and 64 enlisted. The total row for LHD 1–7 includes the combat cargo personnel, 
whereas the total row for LHD 8 does not, accounting for a discrepancy between what this 
thesis reports (one officer and 64 enlisted) and what the total column reports.  
This thesis utilizes the Annual DOD Composite Rate from the FY 2019 Department of 
Defense (DOD) Military Personnel Composite Standard Pay and Reimbursable Rates 
memorandum to estimate cost savings for the total number of personnel listed previously. 
The composite rate includes average basic pay, housing allowance, subsistence allowance, 
incentive pay, special pay, PCS pay, and miscellaneous pay (Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense, 2018). This rate was chosen so that a proper comparison can be drawn between 
the VAMOSC historical cost savings and the SMD implied cost savings. Additionally, the 
SMD was compared for each department, and each loss or gain with respect to LHD 8 was 
recorded by rank.  
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The ranks were then multiplied by the applicable composite pay rates to determine 
total cost savings (reduction in manning for LHD 8) in FY 2019 dollars. These cost savings 
were then adjusted for inflation from the year 2020 to the year 2050 using the JIC inflation 
rate for military pay only (OSD Cost Escalation Element) to build a database of manpower 
cost savings. This database is displayed in Appendix D. A discussion of the results is found 
in Chapter V.  
D. LIMITATIONS 
One limitation to cost-savings estimation was the calculations for in-port pier 
utilities, both steam and electric, due to limited daily usage data availability used to 
determine the class averages for steam and electric usage. Additionally, utility usage is a 
function of both manning as well as environmental factors. As a result, this thesis considers 
the utility usage cost estimations as the most volatile assessment and recommends that 
further study be performed to monitor the energy usage comparisons for LHD-class ships.  
A second limitation was the quantity of historical manpower and fuel data for LHD 
8, which was only available from VAMOSC (U.S. Navy, 2019a) starting in 2009. This 
thesis recognizes that the first years of a ship’s life cycle are likely not entirely 
representative of manning or fuel consumption due to testing and other post-
commissioning activities. Additionally, LHD 8 was the first hybrid large-deck amphibious 
ship the U.S. Navy commissioned, which conceivably resulted in more significant 
manpower numbers than previously observed. Therefore, the potential exists that current 
manpower savings are less than what has been historically observed by employing the LHD 
8 lifetime average, or a reduction in the NPV for conversion. A sensitivity analysis is 
performed using the last five years of historic VAMSOC data for LHD 8, which may better 
represent the actual cost savings of the conversion.  
A third limitation for this thesis on cost-savings estimation was seen in the 
monetizing of maintenance on the propulsion systems discussed in Chapter III. While not 
quantitatively proven by this thesis, it is likely that maintenance costs will be reduced on 
hybrid-powered LHD ships when compared to the steam propulsion system. These cost 
savings would likely be found in both the reduction in quantity and cost of repair parts as 
well as availability costs. Therefore, it is likely that there will be a further increase in cost 
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savings, seen as an increase in the NPV for conversion. Chapter VI discusses future 
analysis recommendations for monetization.  
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V. RESULTS 
Chapter V of this thesis presents the results of the CBA for converting steam-
powered LHD ships. The results are presented in two parts; the first displays the results 
from the CBA that was performed, while the second shows the results of the sensitivity 
analysis that was performed using various cost-driving factors. This thesis provides a 
conservative, rough order of magnitude approach to cost savings by using historic class 
averages and employing fuel predictions from the EIA. Manpower calculations are 
performed using historical VAMOSC data (U.S. Navy, 2019a). SMD data was only used 
as a comparison tool and is therefore not used in any cost-savings calculations due to the 
inherent differences in actual manning compared to Navy SMD predicted manning.  
Additionally, the concurrent OPNAV N95 (2019) conversion study has determined 
that LHD 1–4 are not currently feasible for conversion due to vessel center of gravity 
concerns. Because a cost estimate for the modifications to correct these stability issues has 
not yet been completed, this thesis carries out a CBA on LHD 1–7. As a result of the on-
going conversion study, however, this thesis recommends that the required modifications 
needed to modify LHD 1–4 be added to the cost of conversion once they are determined. 
If it is determined that LHD 1–4 are not feasible for conversion, the CBA performed on 
LHD 5–7 remains unaffected.  
A. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS DETERMINATION 
The results for the CBA, performed using a 30-year nominal discount rate of 3.6%, 
derived from OMB Circular A-94 Appendix C, are displayed in Tables 1–6. The tabulated 
results are presented separately for Norfolk and San Diego due to the inherent differences 
in utility billing rates as well as utility consumption at each port location. Additionally, 
each location has three distinct fuel cases determined by the fuel price model discussed in 
Chapter IV. The completed data tables from FY 2019 to FY 2051 used to formulate these 
results are found in Appendix D for future consideration. NPV figures that are greater than 
zero are highlighted in green, while figures that are within $1 million of having a positive 
NPV are highlighted in yellow. 
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Table 1. NPV Calculation for San Diego – Reference Fuel Price 
Reference Fuel Case - San Diego 
LHD PV Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $177,309,809.77 $386,439,183.30 -$209,129,373.53 
2 $187,578,385.80 $374,595,010.42 -$187,016,624.62 
3 $163,624,129.49 $363,113,855.68 -$199,489,726.19 
4 $366,848,418.41 $411,262,858.89 -$44,414,440.49 
5 $443,223,459.70 $424,266,418.11 $18,957,041.59 
6 $164,740,901.01 $341,196,436.29 -$176,455,535.28 
7 $409,764,426.00 $398,657,852.44 $11,106,573.55 
Table 2. NPV Calculation for San Diego – High Fuel Price 
High Oil Price - San Diego  
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $193,196,624.57 $386,439,183.30 -$193,242,558.73 
2 $203,791,123.50 $374,595,010.42 -$170,803,886.92 
3 $177,534,972.52 $363,113,855.68 -$185,578,883.15 
4 $400,075,978.73 $411,262,858.89 -$11,186,880.16 
5 $485,118,300.28 $424,266,418.11 $60,851,882.17 
6 $178,881,142.32 $341,196,436.29 -$162,315,293.96 
7 $446,761,653.69 $398,657,852.44 $48,103,801.25 
Table 3. NPV Calculation for San Diego – Low Fuel Price 
Low Oil Price - San Diego 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $138,787,107.89 $386,439,183.30 -$247,652,075.41 
2 $146,592,431.39 $374,595,010.42 -$228,002,579.03 
3 $127,890,889.48 $363,113,855.68 -$235,222,966.20 
4 $288,588,518.74 $411,262,858.89 -$122,674,340.16 
5 $350,983,683.15 $424,266,418.11 -$73,282,734.96 
6 $129,786,563.15 $341,196,436.29 -$211,409,873.14 
7 $323,098,048.41 $398,657,852.44 -$75,559,804.03 
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Table 4. NPV Calculation for Norfolk – Reference Fuel Price 
Reference Fuel Case - Norfolk 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $152,879,710.46 $386,439,183.30 -$233,559,472.84 
2 $161,464,769.15 $374,595,010.42 -$213,130,241.27 
3 $140,668,622.03 $363,113,855.68 -$222,445,233.65 
4 $315,926,695.12 $411,262,858.89 -$95,336,163.77 
5 $381,476,941.21 $424,266,418.11 -$42,789,476.89 
6 $140,955,552.32 $341,196,436.29 -$200,240,883.97 
7 $351,744,904.76 $398,657,852.44 -$46,912,947.68 
Table 5. NPV Calculation for Norfolk – High Fuel Price 
High Oil Price - Norfolk 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $168,766,525.26 $386,439,183.30 -$217,672,658.04 
2 $177,677,506.84 $374,595,010.42 -$196,917,503.58 
3 $154,579,465.06 $363,113,855.68 -$208,534,390.61 
4 $349,154,255.45 $411,262,858.89 -$62,108,603.45 
5 $423,371,781.79 $424,266,418.11 -$894,636.31 
6 $155,095,793.63 $341,196,436.29 -$186,100,642.66 
7 $388,742,132.45 $398,657,852.44 -$9,915,719.99 
Table 6. NPV Calculation for Norfolk – Low Fuel Price 
Low Oil Price - Norfolk  
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $114,357,008.58 $386,439,183.30 -$272,082,174.72 
2 $120,478,814.73 $374,595,010.42 -$254,116,195.69 
3 $104,935,382.01 $363,113,855.68 -$258,178,473.66 
4 $237,666,795.45 $411,262,858.89 -$173,596,063.44 
5 $289,237,164.66 $424,266,418.11 -$135,029,253.45 
6 $106,001,214.45 $341,196,436.29 -$235,195,221.83 
7 $265,078,527.17 $398,657,852.44 -$133,579,325.27 
The result of the CBA shows that using the OMB A-94 30-year nominal discount 
rate, Norfolk does not yield any positive NPVs for conversion. This is mainly due to steam 
pricing in Norfolk as compared to San Diego, which was discussed in Chapter IV. The low 
cost of steam in Norfolk results in the conversion having a negative PV for utility 
consumption, thus becoming a cost rather than a benefit. Therefore, if considering 
conversion at a 3.6% SDR, all converted LHD ships are recommended to be located in San 
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Diego. Additionally, based on the current schedule for complex overhauls, LHD 6 does not 
have a positive NPV for conversion. This thesis addresses and makes recommendations 
considering the COH scheduling in Chapter VI.  
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity analysis is performed to “determine how sensitive outcomes are to 
changes in the assumptions” (OMB, 1992, p. 11). The purpose of this section is to discuss 
the primary factors that can affect the NPV results for the CBA. This thesis has identified 
three primary factors: social discount rate (SDR), fuel costs, and LHD 8 manpower cost 
savings. The following sections discuss each of these factors in-depth.  
 Social Discount Rate 
This thesis initially employed the OMB Circular A-94 Appendix C (2018) 30-year 
nominal rate of 3.6% based on OMB forecast recommendations. Another approach, 
however, is to employ an SDR that is representative of the current treasury bond rates. This 
allows for the planner to consider the opportunity cost of the alternative COA, no 
conversion. This thesis has determined a 30-year nominal treasury interest rate of 2.6% by 
taking the average of all 2019 daily 30-year nominal treasury rates. This rate was then 
applied to the NPV calculations performed in the previous section to determine the NPV 
for Norfolk and San Diego. The results for the reference (expected) fuel price are displayed 
in Tables 7 and 8. Tabulated results for the high and low fuel price cases are found in 
Appendix A.  
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Table 7. SDR Adjusted NPV Calculation for San Diego – Reference 
Fuel Price 
Reference Fuel Case - San Diego 
LHD PV Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $206,878,243.57 $386,439,183.30 -$179,560,939.73 
2 $224,161,711.44 $374,595,010.42 -$150,433,298.98 
3 $198,447,972.64 $363,113,855.68 -$164,665,883.04 
4 $430,763,153.19 $411,262,858.89 $19,500,294.30 
5 $519,487,452.97 $424,266,418.11 $95,221,034.86 
6 $208,634,497.67 $341,196,436.29 -$132,561,938.62 
7 $498,842,119.07 $398,657,852.44 $100,184,266.63 
Table 8. SDR Adjusted NPV Calculation for Norfolk – Reference 
Fuel Price 
Reference Fuel Case – Norfolk 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $178,366,570.45 $386,439,183.30 -$208,072,612.85 
2 $192,942,347.70 $374,595,010.42 -$181,652,662.72 
3 $170,597,411.68 $363,113,855.68 -$192,516,444.00 
4 $370,899,822.23 $411,262,858.89 -$40,363,036.67 
5 $447,003,868.18 $424,266,418.11 $22,737,450.07 
6 $178,494,659.67 $341,196,436.29 -$162,701,776.62 
7 $428,039,241.63 $398,657,852.44 $29,381,389.19 
When adjusting the SDR to reflect nominal 30-year treasury interest rates, two 
significant changes appear in the NPV calculations. First, based on the current COH 
schedule, LHD 4 becomes suitable for conversion when considering San Diego as its 
homeport. Second, Norfolk becomes a suitable location for converted LHD 5 and 7, 
considering the reference and high fuel price cases. Therefore, this thesis has determined 
that the SDR must be considered carefully by decision-makers when considering both 
quantity and location of ship conversion.  
 Fuel Costs 
Although the price of fuel based on market volatility is addressed by this thesis by 
the employment of the DDS 200–2 and EIA model, the possible ranges in the price of fuel 
burden are not. As discussed in Chapter IV, the FBCF is the DLA standard energy price 
plus the burdened cost. Up until this point, this thesis has utilized the burdened cost 
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developed in DDS 200–2 and has only adjusted the cost for inflation. Other studies, 
however, have shown that the burdened cost can be higher than what this thesis has 
employed. The primary thesis that has looked at the FBCF for U.S. Navy surface ships was 
a 2009 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis titled Evaluating the Impact of the Fully 
Burdened Cost of Fuel (Corley, 2009). In his thesis, Corley identified the fuel burden cost 
of fueling the DDG-51 fleet by employing a calculating method introduced by the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L]). This method is similar to the one employed by DDS 200–2 (NAVSEA, 
2012), which is used by this thesis.  
One primary difference employed by Corley (2009), however, was the 
determination of the commodity price. Corley calculated and determined that the 
commodity price, or the price paid by the Navy based on historical VAMOSC data, was 
higher than that of the DLA standard energy price. This thesis reperformed the calculation 
method used to calculate commodity price using LHD 1–8 historical VAMOSC data for 
FY 2018 and determined there was no difference in the DLA standard price and the 
commodity price introduced by Corley. The result of Corley’s analysis is shown in Figure 
13.  
 
Figure 13. FBCF Determined for DDG-51 Class Ships. Source: Corley 
(2009). 
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The result from Corley’s (2009) analysis shows that there was a mean FBCF price 
increase that was 166.6% of the total, or 66.6% higher than the price of fuel paid by the 
Navy. The burdened price determined by DDS 200–2 and used in this thesis resulted in 
141.8% of the total, or a 41.8% increase over the commodity price. Therefore, this thesis 
has determined that modifying the total cost of fuel by the mean FBCF presented by Corley 
will provide an upper range to the cost savings provided by fuel consumption reduction. 
The results from a 66.6% increase, or a 166.6% total, using the more conservative SDR of 
3.6%, are displayed in Tables 9 and 10 for the reference (expected) fuel price. Tabulated 
data for high and low fuel prices are found in Appendix B.  
Table 9. Burdened Cost Adjusted NPV Calculation for San Diego – 
Reference Fuel Price 
Reference Fuel Case - San Diego 
LHD PV Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $195,699,367.62 $386,439,183.30 -$190,739,815.68 
2 $207,235,197.59 $374,595,010.42 -$167,359,812.83 
3 $180,903,700.36 $363,113,855.68 -$182,210,155.32 
4 $405,179,329.97 $411,262,858.89 -$6,083,528.93 
5 $489,702,647.49 $424,266,418.11 $65,436,229.38 
6 $182,645,128.09 $341,196,436.29 -$158,551,308.20 
7 $453,405,147.61 $398,657,852.44 $54,747,295.17 
Table 10. Burdened Cost Adjusted NPV Calculation for Norfolk – 
Reference Fuel Price  
Reference Fuel Case - Norfolk 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $171,269,268.31 $386,439,183.30 -$215,169,914.99 
2 $181,121,580.93 $374,595,010.42 -$193,473,429.49 
3 $157,948,192.90 $363,113,855.68 -$205,165,662.78 
4 $354,257,606.68 $411,262,858.89 -$57,005,252.21 
5 $427,956,129.00 $424,266,418.11 $3,689,710.90 
6 $158,859,779.40 $341,196,436.29 -$182,336,656.89 
7 $395,385,626.37 $398,657,852.44 -$3,272,226.07 
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The results from the modification of burdened price show a substantial enough 
NPV increase to have conversion possible for Norfolk-based ships, even at the more 
conservative SDR of 3.6% and reference fuel pricing. This result demonstrates that, when 
determining conversion CBA, fuel burdened costs must be accurately determined. This 
thesis, therefore, recommends that future analysis be performed using a method similar to 
the one introduced by Corley (2009) for LHD class ships in order to provide updated and 
accurate costs of the FBCF.  
 LHD 8 Manning Considerations 
This thesis has determined that there is potential for reduced manpower savings for 
LHD 8 as compared to LHD 1–7 due to both the limited years of available LHD 8 data as 
well as the assumption that the initial years following commissioning were comprised of 
different manning levels than average. Chapter IV displays the historical manpower 
numbers for both officers and enlisted in Figure 9 and Figure 10, respectively. This thesis 
has identified that, while officer manning has trended higher for LHD 8 in the previous 
four years, enlisted manning has had the opposite result potentially due to the ship’s life 
cycle. Additionally, due to officer manning being approximately identical for LHD 1–7 
and LHD 8, this thesis determined that is has a negligible change to overall manpower cost 
savings. The nine-year cost-savings results for LHD 8 in San Diego are displayed in  
Table 11. 
Table 11. Five- and Nine-Year LHD 8 Manpower Cost Savings 










Five-Year Average $4,291,012.40 
Nine-Year Average $6,231,247.83 
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Therefore, in order to establish a lower bound on potential cost savings for manpower, this 
thesis has performed the CBA using the most recent five-year average for historical 
VAMOSC manpower cost savings. The results for the reference (expected) fuel case using 
the more conservative 3.6% SDR are displayed in Tables 12 and 13. The high and low fuel 
price cases are found in Appendix C.  
Table 12. Manpower Cost Adjusted NPV Calculation for San Diego – 
Reference Fuel Price 
Reference Fuel Case - San Diego 
LHD PV Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $163,686,135.76 $386,439,183.30 -$222,753,047.54 
2 $173,015,882.55 $374,595,010.42 -$201,579,127.87 
3 $150,822,775.45 $363,113,855.68 -$212,291,080.23 
4 $338,451,441.81 $411,262,858.89 -$72,811,417.09 
5 $408,789,934.53 $424,266,418.11 -$15,476,483.58 
6 $151,476,778.22 $341,196,436.29 -$189,719,658.07 
7 $377,409,295.79 $398,657,852.44 -$21,248,556.65 
Table 13. Manpower Cost Adjusted NPV Calculation for Norfolk – 
Reference Fuel Price 
Reference Fuel Case - Norfolk 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $139,256,036.45 $386,439,183.30 -$247,183,146.86 
2 $146,902,265.89 $374,595,010.42 -$227,692,744.53 
3 $127,867,267.99 $363,113,855.68 -$235,246,587.69 
4 $287,529,718.52 $411,262,858.89 -$123,733,140.37 
5 $347,043,416.04 $424,266,418.11 -$77,223,002.07 
6 $127,691,429.53 $341,196,436.29 -$213,505,006.76 
7 $319,389,774.56 $398,657,852.44 -$79,268,077.88 
These results show that at the conservative 3.6% SDR conversion is not 
recommended due to all NPVs being negative. The OPNAV N95 conversion study, in 
progress during the production of this thesis, has estimated the annual manpower cost 
savings at $5.8 million FY 2019, and this thesis concurs.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FOLLOW-ON STUDIES 
Chapter VI of this thesis discusses the conclusions and implications from the results 
presented in Chapter V. Additionally, this thesis offers recommendations to maximize the 
benefits to the Navy. Lastly, areas for future research are proposed to develop on the 
analysis conducted.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
There are a few considerations to bear in mind when considering the conclusions 
and recommendations presented. In the late 1990s, the Navy was debating extending the 
service life of the Tarawa-class. The primary argument in opposition was that the high cost 
of modernization, at about $1.5 billion FY 1999, was too high for a ship that would only 
be in service another 15 years. Then there is the negative stereotype that “modernized” 
ships are still old hulls that cannot be upgraded to a revolutionary new design. Furthermore, 
upgrading the Tarawa-class was going to require that one or two ships be kept in 
maintenance and out of service for over ten years (Forecast International, 2010).  
These are the same arguments that we must evaluate when considering modernizing 
the Wasp-class LHD. This thesis only analyzes the cost savings directly involved in the 
conversion of the propulsion and electrical systems. The cost of the COH proposed by 
OPNAV N953 (2018) is not considered. If the Navy approves the complex overhaul plan, 
the COH cost should be combined with the conversion costs to determine the full cost of 
extending the life of an LHD with hybrid propulsion. The highest estimate for the complex 
overhaul proposed by OPNAV N953 (2018) is $700 million FY 2019 per ship. The cost of 
hybrid conversion is estimated at $450 million FY 2019 (OPNAV N95, 2019). Therefore, 
the highest expected cost to convert and overhaul an LHD to hybrid propulsion is $1.15 
billion FY 2019 before any benefits are received. Therefore, the total cost should be 
evaluated against the cost of building a new LHA estimated at $4.1 billion FY 2019 
(Congressional Research Service, 2019). 
Lastly, the complex overhaul and the propulsion plant conversion on LHDs are 
projects that have never been accomplished by the Navy. This type of project carries high 
risks and has been historically known to cause delays and budget overruns in other 
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platforms. The complexity of these projects results in extensive planning and budgeting 
processes, which should be acknowledged and accounted for in the schedule. This thesis 
provides all the required data to perform a CBA on any conversion starting year in the 
appendix sections. If there is a considerable change in the fleet composition based on the 
ongoing Force Structure Assessment, this thesis recommends that the Navy optimizes a 
maintenance schedule that includes hybrid conversion for as many LHDs as required.  
With these considerations in mind, there are specific conclusions from the results 
discussed in Chapter V: 
 Convert LHD 5 and 7 to Hybrid Propulsion 
The primary conclusion is that LHD 5 and 7 should be converted from steam to 
hybrid propulsion and homeported in San Diego following the complex overhaul plan 
proposed by OPNAV N953 (2018). This conclusion is based on the expected values for 
the four primary cost-saving elements evaluated. When modifying the discount rates, fuel 
costs, and manpower costs, the analysis for LHD 4 also yields a positive NPV when 
homeported in San Diego. However, LHD 4 requires additional stability modifications to 
convert. Therefore, the conversion is recommended if the additional costs for stability 
modifications are lower than the NPV calculated. 
Another significant finding is that Norfolk is the preferable location for 
homeporting steam LHDs due to the low cost of steam compared to San Diego. The cost 
of steam in Norfolk is $31.90/MBTU, while the cost of steam in San Diego is $297.82/
MBTU. Therefore, any converted ship should be homeported in San Diego, and steamships 
should be homeported in Norfolk. This course of action requires shifting homeports in 
order to preserve the number of large-deck amphibious ships on each coast. 
 Optimize the Schedule for LHD 6 
The current COH timeline proposed by OPNAV N953 (2018) does not schedule 
LHD 6 until FY 2037, resulting in a negative NPV for all conversion scenarios. As a result, 
this thesis has analyzed potential conversion starting dates, which would result in a positive 
NPV for LHD 6 conversion. The results, calculated as reference fuel price, homeported in 
San Diego, and using the expected 3.6% SDR, concluded that there are only two possible 
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starting dates where LHD 6 could enter a COH period and yield a positive NPV. These 
dates are FY 2023 and FY 2025, with an NPV of $33.8 million FY 2019 and $1.1 million 
FY 2019, respectively. Norfolk retained a negative NPV during this analysis. 
This result indicates that the Navy has a potential for receiving conversion benefits 
in LHD 6 if the COH timeline is changed to benefit the conversion and homeported in San 
Diego. Additionally, if LHD 6 were shifted earlier in the schedule to start in FY 2025, the 
COH schedule would allow for converting LHD 5, 6, and 7 back-to-back. Furthermore, the 
ongoing conversion study being conducted by OPNAV N95 concluded that the weight 
distribution on LHD 1–4 requires additional modifications and further study to preserve 
the ship’s center of gravity (OPNAV N95, 2019). This process may not be completed in 
time for a 2025 conversion of LHD 4. 
This thesis recommends that the COH plan be optimized to convert LHD 6 between 
FY 2023 to FY 2025, which will allow the Navy to maximize the benefits of hybrid 
propulsion on capable hulls. If the industry base and the Navy can only support having one 
LHD in the shipyards at a time as displayed in Figure 1, LHD 5 should be converted to 
hybrid propulsion when it enters the yards in 2023. Then LHD 6 can follow with its 
conversion in 2025, assuming a two-year conversion schedule. Lastly, LHD 7 would follow 
with conversion, on schedule, in 2027. The optimized schedules proposed by this thesis 
would benefit the fleet regardless of whether the Navy desires to reduce or increase the 
number of amphibious ships based on the pending results of the FSA. 
 Future Demand Considerations  
Different factors of Navy policy will determine the future demand for big deck 
amphibious ships. The Navy is conducting a new Force Structure Assessment concurrent 
with this thesis and results from the assessment may change the number of amphibious 
ships the Navy is required to maintain (CBO, 2019). The Vice Chief of Naval Operations 
(VCNO) Admiral Robert P. Burke alluded to a possible reduction in fleet size from that of 
the previous 355-ship requirement imposed by the 2018 NDAA (Werner, 2019). Admiral 
Burke stated, “I think with today’s fiscal situation, where the Navy’s top line is right now, 
we can keep around 305 to 310 ships whole, properly manned, properly maintained, 
properly equipped, and properly ready” (Werner, 2019, p. 3). Though the Navy may reduce 
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the total number of ships in the force, neither the specific breakdown amongst platforms 
nor the demand for large deck amphibious ships will be known until the FSA is published. 
Additionally, the Navy is signaling a change in the way in which LHDs and LHAs 
are employed, which may drive up the demand for big deck amphibious ships. Former 
Secretary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer indicated a possible change in the employment 
of large deck amphibious ships by embracing the “lightning carrier” concept (Eckstein, 
2019). Speaking about the USS America, he stated, “Why don’t we load this thing up with 
F-35 Bravos, put 20 F-35 Bravos on this, and make it quote/unquote a lightning carrier” 
(Eckstein, 2019, p. 13). In addition to the “lightning carrier” concept, there is a demand in 
the fleet for newer and better large deck amphibious ships (Eckstein, 2019). Former 
Director of Expeditionary Warfare (OPNAV N95) Maj. Gen. David Coffman stated, “I 
don’t want to bring Marine Aviation down to third- and fourth-gen; I want to bring the rest 
of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force up to fifth-gen and exploit that technical expertise 
and have a fifth-gen MAGTF. The problem is, we’re having to embark a fifth-gen MAGTF 
on a third-gen ship, and we have to fix that” (Eckstein, 2019, p. 9). 
The aggregate of the fiscal situation, employment method, and capabilities shortfall 
indicate possible changes in Navy policy. This will result in one of three alternatives when 
considering the large deck amphibious force. First, if the Navy increases the number of 
large deck amphibious ships required there will be benefits in extending and converting 
steam powered LHDs. This is because the Navy may need to operate LHDs past the current 
40-year service life to meet force size requirements. When coupled with the COH, 
converted ships will have the added benefit of increased interoperability and lethality by 
modernizing command and control systems (OPNAV N953, 2018). Second, if the FSA 
reduces the requirement, LHD life extension and conversion may not be required to meet 
the large deck amphibious fleet size when compared to current LHD decommissioning and 
LHA construction planning. These two scenarios, to a large extent, are driven by demand. 
The third scenario, however, is more complex and will be driven by policy. 
In the third scenario, the Navy maintains the current requirement for 12 large deck 
amphibious ships directed by the 355-ship plan. This scenario poses the greatest freedom 
for the Navy to decide on a strategic solution that consists of some new and some converted 
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ships. This scenario also benefits from the increased capability and lethality offered by the 
converted LHDs. The Navy has the option to either convert steam powered LHDs or to 
decommission LHDs at the current 40-year service life and replace them with the America-
class Flight 1. If the Navy chooses the latter, then this thesis recommends that the current 
LHA Flight 1 production schedule be expedited to both meet changing demand and reduce 
production costs incurred via the long production break as discussed by the 2019 
Congressional Research Service report on LHA production issues (Congressional Research 
Service, 2019). 
B. FOLLOW-ON STUDIES 
The results of a CBA can yield changes to policies, operations, and procedures. 
These changes can cause unintended second- and third-order effects. Therefore, policy 
changes should be carefully analyzed before implementation. This thesis also recommends 
the following three follow-on studies. 
 LHD 1–4 Stability  
The Navy should conduct a study to determine the extent and cost of the 
modifications required to preserve the vessel’s center of gravity of a converted hybrid ship. 
If the conversion is feasible, the cost of the stability modifications should be added to the 
cost of conversion for that ship. The Navy should only convert a ship if the resulting NPV 
is positive. In other words, the Navy should only convert a ship if the cost of the stability 
modifications is less than the NPV for the ship calculated in this thesis. The Navy should 
only conduct a stability modification study if it intends to extend the service life of any of 
these ships. 
 Steam Infrastructure Reduction 
Converting ships from steam to hybrid propulsion and the resulting homeport shift 
has the potential to produce additional cost savings if accompanied by a reduction on shore 
steam infrastructure in San Diego. This thesis recommends a follow-on study be conducted 
to determine the potential for infrastructure reduction as a result of a significant reduction 
in steam usage. This new study could identify additional monetary benefits of converting 
ships. 
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 Maintenance Requirement Reduction 
This thesis expects a significant reduction in the maintenance requirements for 
converted ships. A hybrid ship should require different types of maintenance and in lesser 
quantities than a steamship. The reduced maintenance should result in a lower operational 
cost. This thesis recommends a study be conducted using LHD 8 to identify the potential 
cost savings of maintenance on converted ships. The study should also examine the impact 
on the maintenance community at large due to the decreased demand for steam plant 
support. This new study could identify additional monetary benefits of converting ships. 
 Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel 
Fuel burden costs utilized by this thesis were derived from a combination of two 
sources, Corley (2009) and the NAVSEA (2012) DDS 200–2. Neither of these sources 
provided an explicit measurement for Wasp-class or America-class fuel burden cost. 
Therefore, this thesis recommends that a follow-on study be performed employing the 
framework constructed by Corley (2009) that focuses on LHD burdened costs. DDS 200–
2 should also be updated to account for an increase in the FBCF. These updated cost 
analyses can then be applied to the fuel model utilized by this thesis to derive an LHD 
specific fully burdened cost of fuel.  
 Manpower 
Manpower cost-savings calculations were based on the available data from LHD 8, 
starting from the year of commissioning. These historical costs are volatile due to inherent 
changes in a ship’s schedule following commissioning, which results in changes in required 
manning. Therefore, this thesis recommends a follow-on study be performed that analyses 
the necessary manpower numbers to support the maintenance, basic, integrated, 
deployment, and sustainment phases of LHD 8’s life-cycle support plan. These results can 
then be compared to both the historical costs derived by this thesis, as well as the SMD, to 
create an updated cost-savings for conversion.  
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 Utilities 
Utility cost-savings calculations were limited based on available data from 
NAVFAC. In order to improve the accuracy of these calculations, follow-on studies should 
focus on gathering data monthly from NAVFAC, starting as soon as possible. Ship 
schedule data should also be combined with the monthly consumption data in order to 
determine an exact monthly usage rate per ship. In order to account for external factors, 
such as environmental changes, this thesis recommends compiling monthly class averages, 
then totaling to determine annual consumption. Additionally, America-class LHAs can be 
incorporated into a monthly monitoring plan to better determine hybrid-propulsion in-port 
averages.  
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APPENDIX A. SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE SENSITIVITY 
ANALYSIS RESULTS 
High Oil Price - San Diego 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $225,401,319.38 $386,439,183.30 -$161,037,863.92 
2 $243,520,262.94 $374,595,010.42 -$131,074,747.48 
3 $215,303,206.17 $363,113,855.68 -$147,810,649.51 
4 $469,642,307.35 $411,262,858.89 $58,379,448.46 
5 $568,256,822.79 $424,266,418.11 $143,990,404.68 
6 $226,555,571.90 $341,196,436.29 -$114,640,864.39 
7 $543,842,084.30 $398,657,852.44 $145,184,231.86 
 
Low Oil Price - San Diego 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $161,928,426.49 $386,439,183.30 -$224,510,756.81 
2 $175,181,246.24 $374,595,010.42 -$199,413,764.18 
3 $155,108,933.83 $363,113,855.68 -$208,004,921.85 
4 $338,773,776.16 $411,262,858.89 -$72,489,082.73 
5 $411,101,360.43 $424,266,418.11 -$13,165,057.68 
6 $164,407,050.60 $341,196,436.29 -$176,789,385.69 
7 $393,536,849.83 $398,657,852.44 -$5,121,002.61 
 
High Oil Price - Norfolk 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $196,889,646.27 $386,439,183.30 -$189,549,537.03 
2 $212,300,899.20 $374,595,010.42 -$162,294,111.22 
3 $187,452,645.21 $363,113,855.68 -$175,661,210.47 
4 $409,778,976.39 $411,262,858.89 -$1,483,882.51 
5 $495,773,238.00 $424,266,418.11 $71,506,819.89 
6 $196,415,733.90 $341,196,436.29 -$144,780,702.39 
7 $473,039,206.86 $398,657,852.44 $74,381,354.42 
 
Low Oil Price - Norfolk 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $133,416,753.38 $386,439,183.30 -$253,022,429.92 
2 $143,961,882.50 $374,595,010.42 -$230,633,127.92 
3 $127,258,372.87 $363,113,855.68 -$235,855,482.81 
4 $278,910,445.20 $411,262,858.89 -$132,352,413.70 
5 $338,617,775.64 $424,266,418.11 -$85,648,642.47 
6 $134,267,212.61 $341,196,436.29 -$206,929,223.68 
7 $322,733,972.39 $398,657,852.44 -$75,923,880.05 
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APPENDIX B. FUEL BURDENED PRICE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
RESULTS 
High Oil Price - San Diego 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $211,586,182.42 $386,439,183.30 -$174,853,000.88 
2 $223,447,935.28 $374,595,010.42 -$151,147,075.14 
3 $194,814,543.39 $363,113,855.68 -$168,299,312.28 
4 $438,406,890.29 $411,262,858.89 $27,144,031.40 
5 $531,597,488.07 $424,266,418.11 $107,331,069.96 
6 $196,785,369.41 $341,196,436.29 -$144,411,066.88 
7 $490,412,692.27 $398,657,852.44 $91,754,839.83 
 
Low Oil Price - San Diego 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $157,176,665.74 $386,439,183.30 -$229,262,517.56 
2 $166,249,243.17 $374,595,010.42 -$208,345,767.25 
3 $145,170,460.34 $363,113,855.68 -$217,943,395.33 
4 $326,919,430.30 $411,262,858.89 -$84,343,428.60 
5 $397,462,870.94 $424,266,418.11 -$26,803,547.17 
6 $147,690,790.23 $341,196,436.29 -$193,505,646.06 
7 $366,744,726.09 $398,657,852.44 -$31,913,126.35 
 
High Oil Price - Norfolk 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $187,156,083.11 $386,439,183.30 -$199,283,100.20 
2 $197,334,318.63 $374,595,010.42 -$177,260,691.79 
3 $171,859,035.93 $363,113,855.68 -$191,254,819.75 
4 $387,485,167.01 $411,262,858.89 -$23,777,691.89 
5 $469,850,969.58 $424,266,418.11 $45,584,551.48 
6 $173,000,020.71 $341,196,436.29 -$168,196,415.57 
7 $432,393,171.03 $398,657,852.44 $33,735,318.59 
 
Low Oil Price - Norfolk 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $132,746,566.43 $386,439,183.30 -$253,692,616.87 
2 $140,135,626.52 $374,595,010.42 -$234,459,383.90 
3 $122,214,952.88 $363,113,855.68 -$240,898,902.79 
4 $275,997,707.01 $411,262,858.89 -$135,265,151.88 
5 $335,716,352.45 $424,266,418.11 -$88,550,065.66 
6 $123,905,441.54 $341,196,436.29 -$217,290,994.75 
7 $308,725,204.86 $398,657,852.44 -$89,932,647.58 
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APPENDIX C. MANPOWER COST-SAVINGS SENSITIVITY 
ANALYSIS RESULTS 
High Oil Price - San Diego 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $179,572,950.55 $386,439,183.30 -$206,866,232.75 
2 $189,228,620.24 $374,595,010.42 -$185,366,390.18 
3 $164,733,618.48 $363,113,855.68 -$198,380,237.20 
4 $371,679,002.13 $411,262,858.89 -$39,583,856.76 
5 $450,684,775.11 $424,266,418.11 $26,418,357.00 
6 $165,617,019.54 $341,196,436.29 -$175,579,416.75 
7 $414,406,523.49 $398,657,852.44 $15,748,671.05 
 
Low Oil Price - San Diego 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $125,163,433.88 $386,439,183.30 -$261,275,749.42 
2 $132,029,928.13 $374,595,010.42 -$242,565,082.29 
3 $115,089,535.43 $363,113,855.68 -$248,024,320.24 
4 $260,191,542.14 $411,262,858.89 -$151,071,316.76 
5 $316,550,157.98 $424,266,418.11 -$107,716,260.13 
6 $116,522,440.36 $341,196,436.29 -$224,673,995.93 
7 $290,742,918.21 $398,657,852.44 -$107,914,934.23 
 
High Oil Price - Norfolk 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $155,142,851.24 $386,439,183.30 -$231,296,332.06 
2 $163,115,003.59 $374,595,010.42 -$211,480,006.83 
3 $141,778,111.02 $363,113,855.68 -$221,335,744.66 
4 $320,757,278.85 $411,262,858.89 -$90,505,580.05 
5 $388,938,256.62 $424,266,418.11 -$35,328,161.49 
6 $141,831,670.84 $341,196,436.29 -$199,364,765.45 
7 $356,387,002.25 $398,657,852.44 -$42,270,850.19 
 
Low Oil Price - Norfolk 
LHD PV Sum Benefits PV Cost NPV 
1 $100,733,334.56 $386,439,183.30 -$285,705,848.74 
2 $105,916,311.48 $374,595,010.42 -$268,678,698.94 
3 $92,134,027.97 $363,113,855.68 -$270,979,827.70 
4 $209,269,818.85 $411,262,858.89 -$201,993,040.04 
5 $254,803,639.49 $424,266,418.11 -$169,462,778.62 
6 $92,737,091.67 $341,196,436.29 -$248,459,344.62 
7 $232,723,396.97 $398,657,852.44 -$165,934,455.47 
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APPENDIX D. COST ESTIMATION TABLES 
Conversion Cost Table SDR at 3.6% 
Year SCN Inflation Total Cost Period PV 
2019 1.0000 $451,520,000.00 0 $451,520,000.00 
2020 1.0200 $460,550,400.00 1 $444,546,718.15 
2021 1.0404 $469,761,408.00 2 $437,681,131.77 
2022 1.0612 $479,156,636.16 3 $430,921,577.61 
2023 1.0824 $488,739,768.88 4 $424,266,418.11 
2024 1.1041 $498,514,564.26 5 $417,714,040.99 
2025 1.1262 $508,484,855.55 6 $411,262,858.89 
2026 1.1487 $518,654,552.66 7 $404,911,308.95 
2027 1.1717 $529,027,643.71 8 $398,657,852.44 
2028 1.1951 $539,608,196.58 9 $392,500,974.41 
2029 1.2190 $550,400,360.52 10 $386,439,183.30 
2030 1.2434 $561,408,367.73 11 $380,471,010.59 
2031 1.2682 $572,636,535.08 12 $374,595,010.42 
2032 1.2936 $584,089,265.78 13 $368,809,759.30 
2033 1.3195 $595,771,051.10 14 $363,113,855.68 
2034 1.3459 $607,686,472.12 15 $357,505,919.68 
2035 1.3728 $619,840,201.56 16 $351,984,592.74 
2036 1.4002 $632,237,005.59 17 $346,548,537.25 
2037 1.4282 $644,881,745.71 18 $341,196,436.29 
2038 1.4568 $657,779,380.62 19 $335,926,993.26 
2039 1.4859 $670,934,968.23 20 $330,738,931.59 
2040 1.5157 $684,353,667.60 21 $325,630,994.42 
2041 1.5460 $698,040,740.95 22 $320,601,944.31 
2042 1.5769 $712,001,555.77 23 $315,650,562.93 
2043 1.6084 $726,241,586.88 24 $310,775,650.76 
2044 1.6406 $740,766,418.62 25 $305,976,026.81 
2045 1.6734 $755,581,746.99 26 $301,250,528.33 
2046 1.7069 $770,693,381.93 27 $296,598,010.52 
2047 1.7410 $786,107,249.57 28 $292,017,346.26 
2048 1.7758 $801,829,394.56 29 $287,507,425.86 
2049 1.8114 $817,865,982.45 30 $283,067,156.73 
2050 1.8476 $834,223,302.10 31 $278,695,463.19 
2051 1.8845 $850,907,768.15 32 $274,391,286.15 
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Manpower Cost Table at 3.6% 
Year MPN Purchase Inflation 




2019 1.0000 $6,231,247.83 0 $6,231,247.83 
2020 1.0200 $6,355,872.79 1 $6,135,012.35 
2021 1.0404 $6,482,990.25 2 $6,040,263.12 
2022 1.0612 $6,612,650.05 3 $5,946,977.20 
2023 1.0824 $6,744,903.05 4 $5,855,132.00 
2024 1.1041 $6,879,801.11 5 $5,764,705.25 
2025 1.1262 $7,017,397.14 6 $5,675,675.05 
2026 1.1487 $7,157,745.08 7 $5,588,019.84 
2027 1.1717 $7,300,899.98 8 $5,501,718.37 
2028 1.1951 $7,446,917.98 9 $5,416,749.75 
2029 1.2190 $7,595,856.34 10 $5,333,093.38 
2030 1.2434 $7,747,773.47 11 $5,250,729.01 
2031 1.2682 $7,902,728.93 12 $5,169,636.67 
2032 1.2936 $8,060,783.51 13 $5,089,796.72 
2033 1.3195 $8,221,999.18 14 $5,011,189.82 
2034 1.3459 $8,386,439.17 15 $4,933,796.92 
2035 1.3728 $8,554,167.95 16 $4,857,599.29 
2036 1.4002 $8,725,251.31 17 $4,782,578.45 
2037 1.4282 $8,899,756.34 18 $4,708,716.23 
2038 1.4568 $9,077,751.46 19 $4,635,994.75 
2039 1.4859 $9,259,306.49 20 $4,564,396.37 
2040 1.5157 $9,444,492.62 21 $4,493,903.77 
2041 1.5460 $9,633,382.47 22 $4,424,499.85 
2042 1.5769 $9,826,050.12 23 $4,356,167.80 
2043 1.6084 $10,022,571.13 24 $4,288,891.08 
2044 1.6406 $10,223,022.55 25 $4,222,653.38 
2045 1.6734 $10,427,483.00 26 $4,157,438.66 
2046 1.7069 $10,636,032.66 27 $4,093,231.11 
2047 1.7410 $10,848,753.31 28 $4,030,015.18 
2048 1.7758 $11,065,728.38 29 $3,967,775.57 
2049 1.8114 $11,287,042.95 30 $3,906,497.18 
2050 1.8476 $11,512,783.81 31 $3,846,165.18 
2051 1.8845 $11,743,039.48 32 $3,786,764.94 
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Utilities Cost Table at 3.6% - San Diego 
Year Inflation Index Steam Cost 
Additional 
Electric Cost Total Savings Period PV 
2019 1.0000 $3,635,264.87 $794,877.24 $2,840,387.63 0 $2,840,387.63 
2020 1.0200 $3,707,970.17 $810,774.79 $2,897,195.38 1 $2,796,520.64 
2021 1.0404 $3,782,129.57 $826,990.28 $2,955,139.29 2 $2,753,331.13 
2022 1.0612 $3,857,772.16 $843,530.09 $3,014,242.08 3 $2,710,808.64 
2023 1.0824 $3,934,927.61 $860,400.69 $3,074,526.92 4 $2,668,942.87 
2024 1.1041 $4,013,626.16 $877,608.70 $3,136,017.46 5 $2,627,723.68 
2025 1.1262 $4,093,898.68 $895,160.88 $3,198,737.80 6 $2,587,141.07 
2026 1.1487 $4,175,776.66 $913,064.09 $3,262,712.56 7 $2,547,185.23 
2027 1.1717 $4,259,292.19 $931,325.38 $3,327,966.81 8 $2,507,846.46 
2028 1.1951 $4,344,478.03 $949,951.88 $3,394,526.15 9 $2,469,115.24 
2029 1.2190 $4,431,367.59 $968,950.92 $3,462,416.67 10 $2,430,982.18 
2030 1.2434 $4,519,994.94 $988,329.94 $3,531,665.00 11 $2,393,438.06 
2031 1.2682 $4,610,394.84 $1,008,096.54 $3,602,298.30 12 $2,356,473.76 
2032 1.2936 $4,702,602.74 $1,028,258.47 $3,674,344.27 13 $2,320,080.35 
2033 1.3195 $4,796,654.80 $1,048,823.64 $3,747,831.16 14 $2,284,248.99 
2034 1.3459 $4,892,587.89 $1,069,800.11 $3,822,787.78 15 $2,248,971.01 
2035 1.3728 $4,990,439.65 $1,091,196.11 $3,899,243.53 16 $2,214,237.87 
2036 1.4002 $5,090,248.44 $1,113,020.04 $3,977,228.41 17 $2,180,041.15 
2037 1.4282 $5,192,053.41 $1,135,280.44 $4,056,772.97 18 $2,146,372.56 
2038 1.4568 $5,295,894.48 $1,157,986.05 $4,137,908.43 19 $2,113,223.95 
2039 1.4859 $5,401,812.37 $1,181,145.77 $4,220,666.60 20 $2,080,587.28 
2040 1.5157 $5,509,848.62 $1,204,768.68 $4,305,079.93 21 $2,048,454.66 
2041 1.5460 $5,620,045.59 $1,228,864.06 $4,391,181.53 22 $2,016,818.30 
2042 1.5769 $5,732,446.50 $1,253,441.34 $4,479,005.16 23 $1,985,670.52 
2043 1.6084 $5,847,095.43 $1,278,510.16 $4,568,585.27 24 $1,955,003.80 
2044 1.6406 $5,964,037.34 $1,304,080.37 $4,659,956.97 25 $1,924,810.69 
2045 1.6734 $6,083,318.09 $1,330,161.97 $4,753,156.11 26 $1,895,083.88 
2046 1.7069 $6,204,984.45 $1,356,765.21 $4,848,219.23 27 $1,865,816.18 
2047 1.7410 $6,329,084.14 $1,383,900.52 $4,945,183.62 28 $1,837,000.48 
2048 1.7758 $6,455,665.82 $1,411,578.53 $5,044,087.29 29 $1,808,629.82 
2049 1.8114 $6,584,779.14 $1,439,810.10 $5,144,969.04 30 $1,780,697.31 
2050 1.8476 $6,716,474.72 $1,468,606.30 $5,247,868.42 31 $1,753,196.20 
2051 1.8845 $6,850,804.21 $1,497,978.43 $5,352,825.79 32 $1,726,119.81 
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Utilities Cost Table at 3.6% - Norfolk 
Year Inflation Index Steam Cost 
Additional 
Electric Cost Total Savings Period PV 
2019 1.0000 $243,159.04 $882,019.69 -$638,860.65 0 -$638,860.65 
2020 1.0200 $248,022.22 $899,660.08 -$651,637.86 1 -$628,994.07 
2021 1.0404 $252,982.67 $917,653.28 -$664,670.62 2 -$619,279.88 
2022 1.0612 $258,042.32 $936,006.35 -$677,964.03 3 -$609,715.71 
2023 1.0824 $263,203.17 $954,726.47 -$691,523.31 4 -$600,299.25 
2024 1.1041 $268,467.23 $973,821.00 -$705,353.77 5 -$591,028.22 
2025 1.1262 $273,836.57 $993,297.42 -$719,460.85 6 -$581,900.37 
2026 1.1487 $279,313.30 $1,013,163.37 -$733,850.07 7 -$572,913.49 
2027 1.1717 $284,899.57 $1,033,426.64 -$748,527.07 8 -$564,065.41 
2028 1.1951 $290,597.56 $1,054,095.17 -$763,497.61 9 -$555,353.97 
2029 1.2190 $296,409.51 $1,075,177.08 -$778,767.56 10 -$546,777.08 
2030 1.2434 $302,337.70 $1,096,680.62 -$794,342.91 11 -$538,332.64 
2031 1.2682 $308,384.46 $1,118,614.23 -$810,229.77 12 -$530,018.63 
2032 1.2936 $314,552.15 $1,140,986.51 -$826,434.37 13 -$521,833.01 
2033 1.3195 $320,843.19 $1,163,806.24 -$842,963.05 14 -$513,773.81 
2034 1.3459 $327,260.05 $1,187,082.37 -$859,822.31 15 -$505,839.08 
2035 1.3728 $333,805.25 $1,210,824.02 -$877,018.76 16 -$498,026.90 
2036 1.4002 $340,481.36 $1,235,040.50 -$894,559.14 17 -$490,335.36 
2037 1.4282 $347,290.99 $1,259,741.31 -$912,450.32 18 -$482,762.61 
2038 1.4568 $354,236.81 $1,284,936.13 -$930,699.33 19 -$475,306.82 
2039 1.4859 $361,321.54 $1,310,634.85 -$949,313.31 20 -$467,966.17 
2040 1.5157 $368,547.97 $1,336,847.55 -$968,299.58 21 -$460,738.90 
2041 1.5460 $375,918.93 $1,363,584.50 -$987,665.57 22 -$453,623.24 
2042 1.5769 $383,437.31 $1,390,856.19 -$1,007,418.88 23 -$446,617.47 
2043 1.6084 $391,106.06 $1,418,673.32 -$1,027,567.26 24 -$439,719.91 
2044 1.6406 $398,928.18 $1,447,046.78 -$1,048,118.60 25 -$432,928.87 
2045 1.6734 $406,906.74 $1,475,987.72 -$1,069,080.98 26 -$426,242.71 
2046 1.7069 $415,044.88 $1,505,507.47 -$1,090,462.60 27 -$419,659.81 
2047 1.7410 $423,345.78 $1,535,617.62 -$1,112,271.85 28 -$413,178.58 
2048 1.7758 $431,812.69 $1,566,329.98 -$1,134,517.28 29 -$406,797.44 
2049 1.8114 $440,448.94 $1,597,656.57 -$1,157,207.63 30 -$400,514.85 
2050 1.8476 $449,257.92 $1,629,609.71 -$1,180,351.78 31 -$394,329.30 
2051 1.8845 $458,243.08 $1,662,201.90 -$1,203,958.82 32 -$388,239.27 
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Difference 
Between LHD 1–
7 and LHD 8 
Period  Present Value  
2019 178.64 $23,129,581.95 $10,729,950.26 $12,399,631.70 0 $12,399,631.70 
2020 187.37 $24,260,616.04 $11,254,643.68 $13,005,972.36 1 $12,554,027.38 
2021 192.15 $24,879,903.74 $11,541,934.91 $13,337,968.82 2 $12,427,111.28 
2022 194.17 $25,141,041.81 $11,663,078.41 $13,477,963.40 3 $12,121,182.95 
2023 198.03 $25,640,195.31 $11,894,638.68 $13,745,556.63 4 $11,932,276.53 
2024 205.63 $26,624,885.94 $12,351,442.51 $14,273,443.43 5 $11,959,967.00 
2025 211.43 $27,376,136.95 $12,699,952.30 $14,676,184.64 6 $11,870,107.02 
2026 218.39 $28,276,325.33 $13,117,555.04 $15,158,770.30 7 $11,834,384.74 
2027 227.30 $29,431,070.42 $13,653,248.13 $15,777,822.29 8 $11,889,648.54 
2028 228.79 $29,623,843.92 $13,742,676.90 $15,881,167.02 9 $11,551,665.76 
2029 236.42 $30,611,549.22 $14,200,879.25 $16,410,669.97 10 $11,522,023.52 
2030 238.90 $30,931,868.59 $14,349,477.30 $16,582,391.29 11 $11,238,021.26 
2031 243.19 $31,487,657.53 $14,607,311.09 $16,880,346.44 12 $11,042,420.74 
2032 247.59 $32,058,097.70 $14,871,941.67 $17,186,156.03 13 $10,851,803.72 
2033 254.53 $32,956,718.22 $15,288,817.06 $17,667,901.16 14 $10,768,330.72 
2034 254.87 $33,000,374.11 $15,309,069.28 $17,691,304.82 15 $10,407,910.15 
2035 258.94 $33,526,971.88 $15,553,361.11 $17,973,610.77 16 $10,206,556.54 
2036 266.32 $34,482,163.75 $15,996,480.29 $18,485,683.46 17 $10,132,571.34 
2037 264.44 $34,239,852.12 $15,884,070.49 $18,355,781.64 18 $9,711,745.33 
2038 267.98 $34,697,283.38 $16,096,275.56 $18,601,007.82 19 $9,499,508.21 
2039 271.54 $35,158,689.20 $16,310,324.46 $18,848,364.75 20 $9,291,344.64 
2040 274.79 $35,578,990.70 $16,505,304.81 $19,073,685.88 21 $9,075,692.29 
2041 277.27 $35,900,683.45 $16,654,539.99 $19,246,143.46 22 $8,839,528.49 
2042 283.86 $36,753,984.65 $17,050,391.48 $19,703,593.18 23 $8,735,163.89 
2043 284.78 $36,872,351.02 $17,105,302.34 $19,767,048.68 24 $8,458,779.46 
2044 285.77 $37,000,958.04 $17,164,963.90 $19,835,994.15 25 $8,193,323.19 
2045 287.37 $37,208,518.70 $17,261,252.52 $19,947,266.18 26 $7,952,977.29 
2046 289.41 $37,472,974.13 $17,383,934.96 $20,089,039.17 27 $7,731,179.73 
2047 291.59 $37,754,201.82 $17,514,398.15 $20,239,803.66 28 $7,518,533.58 
2048 293.60 $38,015,024.65 $17,635,395.41 $20,379,629.24 29 $7,307,408.26 
2049 295.40 $38,248,396.23 $17,743,657.87 $20,504,738.36 30 $7,096,783.72 
2050 297.16 $38,475,917.21 $17,849,206.20 $20,626,711.01 31 $6,890,925.68 
2051 296.82 $38,431,723.66 $17,828,704.56 $20,603,019.11 32 $6,643,832.77 
  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 70 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 





Cost LHD 1–7 Cost LHD 8 
Difference 
Between LHD 
1–7 and LHD 8 
Period Present Value 
2019 $178.64 $23,129,581.95 $10,729,950.26 $12,399,631.70 0 $12,399,631.70 
2020 $200.24 $25,927,436.19 $12,027,891.43 $13,899,544.76 1 $13,416,549.00 
2021 $221.31 $28,655,198.70 $13,293,316.64 $15,361,882.06 2 $14,312,810.31 
2022 $234.41 $30,350,791.98 $14,079,912.42 $16,270,879.56 3 $14,632,945.81 
2023 $244.62 $31,673,379.22 $14,693,468.48 $16,979,910.74 4 $14,739,962.59 
2024 $252.57 $32,701,962.73 $15,170,634.48 $17,531,328.26 5 $14,689,805.46 
2025 $259.01 $33,536,819.66 $15,557,929.56 $17,978,890.11 6 $14,541,337.20 
2026 $257.38 $33,325,848.01 $15,460,058.55 $17,865,789.45 7 $13,947,742.59 
2027 $261.20 $33,820,025.88 $15,689,310.60 $18,130,715.28 8 $13,662,711.40 
2028 $265.61 $34,391,134.36 $15,954,251.21 $18,436,883.15 9 $13,410,646.18 
2029 $271.49 $35,152,380.55 $16,307,397.84 $18,844,982.72 10 $13,231,168.17 
2030 $278.62 $36,075,186.79 $16,735,493.12 $19,339,693.67 11 $13,106,667.48 
2031 $278.99 $36,123,883.17 $16,758,083.66 $19,365,799.51 12 $12,668,300.79 
2032 $284.13 $36,788,619.78 $17,066,458.92 $19,722,160.86 13 $12,453,105.76 
2033 $288.05 $37,297,000.99 $17,302,299.98 $19,994,701.01 14 $12,186,481.64 
2034 $291.94 $37,800,090.04 $17,535,685.97 $20,264,404.07 15 $11,921,681.24 
2035 $296.39 $38,376,720.60 $17,803,188.31 $20,573,532.29 16 $11,682,956.94 
2036 $300.09 $38,854,829.20 $18,024,985.72 $20,829,843.48 17 $11,417,477.50 
2037 $300.53 $38,912,128.38 $18,051,567.15 $20,860,561.23 18 $11,036,983.44 
2038 $305.38 $39,540,512.27 $18,343,078.17 $21,197,434.10 19 $10,825,499.42 
2039 $308.97 $40,005,344.69 $18,558,716.69 $21,446,628.01 20 $10,572,164.47 
2040 $312.19 $40,421,726.01 $18,751,878.45 $21,669,847.56 21 $10,311,004.89 
2041 $315.44 $40,843,150.21 $18,947,379.63 $21,895,770.58 22 $10,056,471.22 
2042 $317.61 $41,123,982.68 $19,077,659.48 $22,046,323.20 23 $9,773,762.81 
2043 $320.79 $41,535,176.74 $19,268,414.84 $22,266,761.89 24 $9,528,464.83 
2044 $324.96 $42,074,868.80 $19,518,781.19 $22,556,087.60 25 $9,316,866.82 
2045 $328.38 $42,517,636.06 $19,724,183.55 $22,793,452.51 26 $9,087,752.10 
2046 $331.32 $42,898,411.23 $19,900,827.41 $22,997,583.82 27 $8,850,520.54 
2047 $334.55 $43,317,582.21 $20,095,283.32 $23,222,298.90 28 $8,626,449.00 
2048 $338.30 $43,802,769.98 $20,320,364.80 $23,482,405.18 29 $8,419,953.06 
2049 $341.72 $44,246,098.16 $20,526,027.37 $23,720,070.79 30 $8,209,624.97 
2050 $344.98 $44,667,458.44 $20,721,498.90 $23,945,959.53 31 $7,999,812.84 
2051 $346.86 $44,911,490.72 $20,834,706.92 $24,076,783.79 32 $7,764,013.82 
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2019 $178.64 $23,129,581.95 $10,729,950.26 $12,399,631.70 0 $12,399,631.70 
2020 $151.70 $19,642,574.18 $9,112,306.67 $10,530,267.51 1 $10,164,350.88 
2021 $154.40 $19,991,639.99 $9,274,240.37 $10,717,399.62 2 $9,985,502.25 
2022 $154.62 $20,019,737.77 $9,287,275.10 $10,732,462.68 3 $9,652,062.39 
2023 $156.58 $20,273,962.29 $9,405,211.36 $10,868,750.94 4 $9,434,971.99 
2024 $158.28 $20,494,089.95 $9,507,329.88 $10,986,760.06 5 $9,205,997.72 
2025 $159.62 $20,667,932.31 $9,587,976.38 $11,079,955.92 6 $8,961,475.06 
2026 $156.74 $20,293,926.95 $9,414,473.08 $10,879,453.87 7 $8,493,541.39 
2027 $158.68 $20,545,685.95 $9,531,265.57 $11,014,420.38 8 $8,300,105.34 
2028 $159.45 $20,644,848.11 $9,577,267.49 $11,067,580.62 9 $8,050,352.47 
2029 $159.84 $20,696,206.37 $9,601,092.89 $11,095,113.48 10 $7,789,941.47 
2030 $161.29 $20,884,118.69 $9,688,266.53 $11,195,852.16 11 $7,587,519.94 
2031 $161.93 $20,965,953.43 $9,726,230.15 $11,239,723.28 12 $7,352,559.61 
2032 $165.59 $21,440,139.38 $9,946,207.83 $11,493,931.56 13 $7,257,579.24 
2033 $168.02 $21,755,119.09 $10,092,328.78 $11,662,790.31 14 $7,108,302.34 
2034 $168.44 $21,810,054.23 $10,117,813.52 $11,692,240.71 15 $6,878,621.56 
2035 $170.75 $22,107,999.53 $10,256,032.11 $11,851,967.42 16 $6,730,299.06 
2036 $173.14 $22,418,308.91 $10,399,986.47 $12,018,322.44 17 $6,587,611.96 
2037 $177.02 $22,920,450.35 $10,632,932.86 $12,287,517.49 18 $6,501,125.52 
2038 $175.55 $22,729,700.73 $10,544,442.98 $12,185,257.75 19 $6,222,993.78 
2039 $178.51 $23,113,465.87 $10,722,473.91 $12,390,991.96 20 $6,108,167.91 
2040 $180.07 $23,315,125.24 $10,816,024.89 $12,499,100.35 21 $5,947,355.40 
2041 $181.28 $23,472,374.73 $10,888,973.86 $12,583,400.87 22 $5,779,408.78 
2042 $183.50 $23,759,246.27 $11,022,055.27 $12,737,191.00 23 $5,646,759.45 
2043 $185.80 $24,057,306.96 $11,160,327.39 $12,896,979.57 24 $5,518,917.25 
2044 $187.66 $24,297,553.49 $11,271,779.18 $13,025,774.31 25 $5,380,339.30 
2045 $191.82 $24,836,931.02 $11,521,999.61 $13,314,931.40 26 $5,308,664.66 
2046 $192.52 $24,927,138.44 $11,563,847.37 $13,363,291.07 27 $5,142,804.70 
2047 $195.72 $25,341,626.34 $11,756,130.77 $13,585,495.57 28 $5,046,640.10 
2048 $198.75 $25,734,298.65 $11,938,293.78 $13,796,004.87 29 $4,946,755.35 
2049 $201.87 $26,138,293.93 $12,125,709.59 $14,012,584.34 30 $4,849,819.52 
2050 $204.04 $26,419,083.69 $12,255,969.62 $14,163,114.07 31 $4,731,581.61 
2051 $204.59 $26,489,583.35 $12,288,674.83 $14,200,908.52 32 $4,579,351.25 
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2019 $178.64 $3,432,864.71 $505,418.54 $2,927,446.18 0 $2,927,446.18 
2020 $187.37 $3,600,731.43 $530,133.45 $3,070,597.98 1 $2,963,897.67 
2021 $192.15 $3,692,645.37 $543,665.88 $3,148,979.49 2 $2,933,933.87 
2022 $194.17 $3,731,403.17 $549,372.17 $3,182,031.00 3 $2,861,706.83 
2023 $198.03 $3,805,486.93 $560,279.47 $3,245,207.45 4 $2,817,107.65 
2024 $205.63 $3,951,633.52 $581,796.55 $3,369,836.98 5 $2,823,645.13 
2025 $211.43 $4,063,133.29 $598,212.59 $3,464,920.71 6 $2,802,429.96 
2026 $218.39 $4,196,738.17 $617,883.15 $3,578,855.02 7 $2,793,996.24 
2027 $227.30 $4,368,124.05 $643,116.19 $3,725,007.86 8 $2,807,043.55 
2028 $228.79 $4,396,735.26 $647,328.60 $3,749,406.66 9 $2,727,248.73 
2029 $236.42 $4,543,329.29 $668,911.55 $3,874,417.74 10 $2,720,250.45 
2030 $238.90 $4,590,870.71 $675,911.04 $3,914,959.67 11 $2,653,199.96 
2031 $243.19 $4,673,360.23 $688,055.92 $3,985,304.31 12 $2,607,020.37 
2032 $247.59 $4,758,024.27 $700,520.95 $4,057,503.32 13 $2,562,017.33 
2033 $254.53 $4,891,396.45 $720,157.26 $4,171,239.19 14 $2,542,310.08 
2034 $254.87 $4,897,875.80 $721,111.21 $4,176,764.60 15 $2,457,217.89 
2035 $258.94 $4,976,032.81 $732,618.22 $4,243,414.60 16 $2,409,680.03 
2036 $266.32 $5,117,801.24 $753,490.69 $4,364,310.55 17 $2,392,212.77 
2037 $264.44 $5,081,837.64 $748,195.80 $4,333,641.84 18 $2,292,859.37 
2038 $267.98 $5,149,729.04 $758,191.40 $4,391,537.63 19 $2,242,752.02 
2039 $271.54 $5,218,210.33 $768,273.86 $4,449,936.47 20 $2,193,606.39 
2040 $274.79 $5,280,590.98 $777,458.13 $4,503,132.85 21 $2,142,692.73 
2041 $277.27 $5,328,336.23 $784,487.63 $4,543,848.60 22 $2,086,936.49 
2042 $283.86 $5,454,982.16 $803,133.63 $4,651,848.53 23 $2,062,296.91 
2043 $284.78 $5,472,549.96 $805,720.13 $4,666,829.83 24 $1,997,044.93 
2044 $285.77 $5,491,637.66 $808,530.40 $4,683,107.26 25 $1,934,372.99 
2045 $287.37 $5,522,443.56 $813,065.93 $4,709,377.63 26 $1,877,629.40 
2046 $289.41 $5,561,693.72 $818,844.71 $4,742,849.01 27 $1,825,264.90 
2047 $291.59 $5,603,433.19 $824,989.98 $4,778,443.21 28 $1,775,060.98 
2048 $293.60 $5,642,144.20 $830,689.38 $4,811,454.82 29 $1,725,216.11 
2049 $295.40 $5,676,780.93 $835,788.93 $4,840,992.00 30 $1,675,489.47 
2050 $297.16 $5,710,549.32 $840,760.63 $4,869,788.70 31 $1,626,888.16 
2051 $296.82 $5,703,990.17 $839,794.93 $4,864,195.24 32 $1,568,551.66 
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2019 $178.64 $3,432,864.71 $505,418.54 $2,927,446.18 0 $2,927,446.18 
2020 $200.24 $3,848,118.87 $566,556.15 $3,281,562.72 1 $3,167,531.59 
2021 $221.31 $4,252,970.10 $626,162.14 $3,626,807.96 2 $3,379,131.16 
2022 $234.41 $4,504,628.01 $663,213.58 $3,841,414.43 3 $3,454,712.39 
2023 $244.62 $4,700,924.82 $692,114.24 $4,008,810.58 4 $3,479,978.13 
2024 $252.57 $4,853,585.95 $714,590.44 $4,138,995.51 5 $3,468,136.47 
2025 $259.01 $4,977,494.41 $732,833.41 $4,244,661.00 6 $3,433,084.39 
2026 $257.38 $4,946,182.25 $728,223.34 $4,217,958.91 7 $3,292,941.82 
2027 $261.20 $5,019,527.53 $739,021.92 $4,280,505.62 8 $3,225,648.41 
2028 $265.61 $5,104,290.77 $751,501.56 $4,352,789.21 9 $3,166,137.98 
2029 $271.49 $5,217,274.01 $768,136.01 $4,449,138.00 10 $3,123,764.77 
2030 $278.62 $5,354,235.80 $788,300.81 $4,565,934.99 11 $3,094,371.23 
2031 $278.99 $5,361,463.26 $789,364.90 $4,572,098.36 12 $2,990,876.63 
2032 $284.13 $5,460,122.67 $803,890.46 $4,656,232.20 13 $2,940,070.94 
2033 $288.05 $5,535,576.00 $814,999.41 $4,720,576.58 14 $2,877,123.29 
2034 $291.94 $5,610,243.87 $825,992.72 $4,784,251.15 15 $2,814,606.19 
2035 $296.39 $5,695,826.68 $838,593.02 $4,857,233.66 16 $2,758,245.44 
2036 $300.09 $5,766,786.98 $849,040.46 $4,917,746.52 17 $2,695,568.04 
2037 $300.53 $5,775,291.26 $850,292.54 $4,924,998.72 18 $2,605,736.67 
2038 $305.38 $5,868,555.24 $864,023.74 $5,004,531.50 19 $2,555,807.11 
2039 $308.97 $5,937,545.11 $874,181.07 $5,063,364.03 20 $2,495,996.91 
2040 $312.19 $5,999,343.92 $883,279.67 $5,116,064.25 21 $2,434,339.39 
2041 $315.44 $6,061,891.19 $892,488.47 $5,169,402.72 22 $2,374,246.18 
2042 $317.61 $6,103,572.01 $898,625.11 $5,204,946.90 23 $2,307,501.16 
2043 $320.79 $6,164,600.94 $907,610.36 $5,256,990.58 24 $2,249,588.42 
2044 $324.96 $6,244,701.38 $919,403.50 $5,325,297.88 25 $2,199,631.96 
2045 $328.38 $6,310,416.37 $929,078.68 $5,381,337.69 26 $2,145,539.95 
2046 $331.32 $6,366,930.56 $937,399.23 $5,429,531.33 27 $2,089,531.62 
2047 $334.55 $6,429,143.41 $946,558.79 $5,482,584.63 28 $2,036,630.26 
2048 $338.30 $6,501,154.40 $957,160.92 $5,543,993.48 29 $1,987,878.35 
2049 $341.72 $6,566,952.63 $966,848.35 $5,600,104.28 30 $1,938,221.70 
2050 $344.98 $6,629,490.42 $976,055.75 $5,653,434.67 31 $1,888,686.86 
2051 $346.86 $6,665,709.40 $981,388.25 $5,684,321.15 32 $1,833,016.75 
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Cost LHD 1–7 Cost LHD 8 
Difference 
Between LHD 1–7 
and LHD 8 
Period  Present Value  
2019 $178.64 $3,432,864.71 $505,418.54 $2,927,446.18 0 $2,927,446.18 
2020 $151.70 $2,915,327.22 $429,221.81 $2,486,105.40 1 $2,399,715.64 
2021 $154.40 $2,967,135.14 $436,849.46 $2,530,285.68 2 $2,357,491.02 
2022 $154.62 $2,971,305.38 $437,463.44 $2,533,841.94 3 $2,278,768.74 
2023 $156.58 $3,009,037.08 $443,018.66 $2,566,018.42 4 $2,227,515.57 
2024 $158.28 $3,041,708.16 $447,828.80 $2,593,879.36 5 $2,173,456.72 
2025 $159.62 $3,067,509.64 $451,627.54 $2,615,882.10 6 $2,115,727.03 
2026 $156.74 $3,012,000.21 $443,454.92 $2,568,545.29 7 $2,005,251.92 
2027 $158.68 $3,049,365.98 $448,956.26 $2,600,409.72 8 $1,959,583.34 
2028 $159.45 $3,064,083.51 $451,123.11 $2,612,960.40 9 $1,900,618.84 
2029 $159.84 $3,071,706.04 $452,245.37 $2,619,460.67 10 $1,839,138.04 
2030 $161.29 $3,099,595.76 $456,351.56 $2,643,244.20 11 $1,791,348.06 
2031 $161.93 $3,111,741.57 $458,139.78 $2,653,601.80 12 $1,735,875.96 
2032 $165.59 $3,182,119.68 $468,501.50 $2,713,618.18 13 $1,713,451.91 
2033 $168.02 $3,228,868.59 $475,384.31 $2,753,484.28 14 $1,678,208.92 
2034 $168.44 $3,237,022.00 $476,584.74 $2,760,437.26 15 $1,623,983.27 
2035 $170.75 $3,281,242.68 $483,095.32 $2,798,147.36 16 $1,588,965.60 
2036 $173.14 $3,327,298.42 $489,876.08 $2,837,422.35 17 $1,555,278.41 
2037 $177.02 $3,401,825.65 $500,848.68 $2,900,976.98 18 $1,534,859.71 
2038 $175.55 $3,373,514.82 $496,680.49 $2,876,834.33 19 $1,469,195.20 
2039 $178.51 $3,430,472.78 $505,066.37 $2,925,406.41 20 $1,442,085.80 
2040 $180.07 $3,460,402.83 $509,472.96 $2,950,929.87 21 $1,404,119.35 
2041 $181.28 $3,483,741.60 $512,909.11 $2,970,832.49 22 $1,364,468.60 
2042 $183.50 $3,526,318.73 $519,177.71 $3,007,141.02 23 $1,333,151.24 
2043 $185.80 $3,570,556.54 $525,690.82 $3,044,865.72 24 $1,302,968.80 
2044 $187.66 $3,606,213.64 $530,940.59 $3,075,273.05 25 $1,270,251.74 
2045 $191.82 $3,686,267.41 $542,726.86 $3,143,540.55 26 $1,253,329.97 
2046 $192.52 $3,699,655.88 $544,698.04 $3,154,957.85 27 $1,214,171.87 
2047 $195.72 $3,761,173.68 $553,755.26 $3,207,418.42 28 $1,191,468.23 
2048 $198.75 $3,819,453.63 $562,335.78 $3,257,117.85 29 $1,167,886.30 
2049 $201.87 $3,879,414.12 $571,163.73 $3,308,250.39 30 $1,145,000.59 
2050 $204.04 $3,921,088.60 $577,299.44 $3,343,789.17 31 $1,117,085.64 
2051 $204.59 $3,931,552.08 $578,839.97 $3,352,712.11 32 $1,081,145.36 
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